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Abstract
At each moment in time, some alternative from a finite set is selected by a dynamic
process. Players observe the alternative selected and sequentially cast a yes or a no
vote. If the set of players casting a yes–vote is decisive for the alternative in question,
the alternative is accepted and the game ends. Otherwise the next period begins.
We refer to this class of problems as collective stopping problems. Collective choice
games, quitting games, and coalition formation games are particular examples that
fit nicely into this more general framework.
When the core of this game is non–empty, a stationary equilibrium in pure strate-
gies is shown to exist. But in general, even mixed stationary equilibria may not
exist in collective stopping games. We consider strategies that are pure and action–
independent, and allow for a limited degree of history dependence. Under such indi-
vidual behavior, aggregate behavior can be conveniently summarized by a collective
strategy. We consider collective strategies that are simple and induced by two–step
game–plans and provide a constructive proof that this collection always contains a
subgame perfect equilibrium. The existence of such an equilibrium is shown to imply
the existence of a sequential equilibrium in an extended model with incomplete infor-
mation. Collective equilibria are shown to be robust to perturbations in the dynamic
process and in utilities. We apply our approach to the case with three alternatives
exhibiting a Condorcet cycle and to the Baron-Ferejohn model of redistributive pol-
itics.
JEL classification code: C62, C72, C73, C78.
Keywords: Voting, Collective choice, Coalition formation, Subgame perfect equilibrium,
Stationary equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
We study a class of games with the following features. At each moment in time, an
alternative is selected by means of a dynamic process, and the chosen alternative is put
to a vote. If the set of players who votes in favor of the alternative is decisive for the
alternative in question, the alternative is implemented, each player receives a payoff as
determined by the alternative, and the game ends. Otherwise, the game moves to the next
period with the dynamic process selecting a new alternative, and the whole process repeats
itself until some alternative is selected. This set–up is sufficiently general to encompass
classical problems in the literatures on collective choice, quitting, and coalition formation
as special cases.
Indeed, many applications in collective choice involve the sequential evaluation of al-
ternatives by a committee. When a given alternative is rejected, the committee members
will consider a new alternative in a subsequent time period. Moreover, in many cases, none
of the committee members has full control over the contents of the new proposal. Compte
and Jehiel (2010a) study such problems and mention recruitment decisions in which can-
didates are examined one by one, business decisions where financing capacity for projects
is scarce, and family decisions concerning housing as particular examples.
The decision the committee has to make is whether to accept the current proposal and
stop searching, or to reject the current proposal and wait for a better alternative to arrive.
Penn (2009) argues that, even though in real–life political processes the proposals might be
chosen strategically, it is a useful simplifying assumption to consider them as exogenously
generated as the outcome of some random process. The rules of the agenda–setting might
be extremely complex, and modeling such an agenda–setting process faithfully might be
unnecessary and even undesirable. Roberts (2007), Penn (2009), and Compte and Jehiel
(2010a) all assume that the new alternative is drawn from a fixed probability distribution.
Nevertheless, in many cases it is more realistic to assume that the probability by which
a particular new alternative is selected may depend on the characteristics of the current
alternative. We allow for this much richer class of selection dynamics in this paper.
In many collective choice problems, it is natural to assume that the decision–making
body and its approval rules are fixed. In other problems, the decision–making body or the
approval rule depend on the proposal in question. For instance, in quitting games as studied
in Solan (2005) and Mashiah–Yaakovi (2009), nature chooses a player and the chosen player
decides whether the game should continue or stop. Such games are a variation on wars of
attrition models, first analyzed by Maynard–Smith (1974), with economic applications like
patent races, oligopoly exit games, and and all-pay auctions.
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In economic applications like oligopoly exit games, stopping decisions are usually taken
by management teams that consist of several decision makers and where decision making
takes place by majority or unanimity rule. This motivates the study of stopping problems
where at each stage there is a collection of coalitions that can decide to stop the process
and where the collection of decisive coalitions may depend on the alternative under con-
sideration. The class of games that we study is therefore also sufficiently general to admit
an interpretation of coalition formation. Under this interpretation, in each time period na-
ture selects a coalition and an allocation of payoffs, which is implemented if the coalition
members all approve. Contrary to standard non-cooperative models of coalition formation
as in Bloch (1996), Okada (1996), Ray and Vohra (1999), or Compte and Jehiel (2010b),
nature does not first select a player, who next proposes a coalition, but directly selects the
coalition itself.
The core consists of those alternatives for which no alternative and associated decisive
coalition exists that gives each decisive coalition member a strictly higher utility. We find
that each core element, if it exists, naturally induces a subgame perfect equilibrium in
pure stationary strategies. When the core is empty, however, subgame perfect equilibrium
need not even exist in mixed stationary strategies, where the intuition for non–existence is
closely related to the logic of the Condorcet paradox. In the presence of discounting or a
positive probability of breakdown, stationary equilibria do exist, but might require the use
of mixing. Our approach is to insist on pure strategies but allow for history–dependence.
We cover both discounted and non–discounted payoffs as special cases.
Duggan’s (2011) extremely rich coalitional bargaining framework encompasses many
classical bargaining and coalition formation models as special cases and obtains equilib-
rium existence in mixed stationary strategies. In this paper we focus on equilibria in pure
strategies, and relax the stationarity assumption. While Duggan studies the case with dis-
counted payoffs, our results and techniques apply equally to discounted and non–discounted
payoffs.
In the context of collective choice problems, history–dependent strategies have been
considered by Bernheim and Slavov (2009) and Vartiainen (2011). While these papers
use methods that do not belong to the domain of non–cooperative game theory, the au-
thors point out the similarity of their solution concepts to a strategy in a dynamic non–
cooperative game. In both contributions the choice of the policy in a given period of time
can be conditioned on the entire history of policies chosen up to that period. The model
in Bernheim and Slavov (2009) describes situations where the policy is being reconsidered
every time period. Likewise in Vartiainen (2011), who builds on the model by Konishi and
Ray (2003), a current policy can be altered by an active coalition at any point in time. In
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contrast to these contributions, our approach is entirely non–cooperative.
For the same reasons Maskin and Tirole (2001) provide for the study of stationary
strategies, i.e. reducing the multiplicity of equilibria in dynamic games, reducing the num-
ber of parameters to be estimated in econometric models, and amenability to simulation
techniques, we are interested in the question whether there are relatively “simple” subgame
perfect equilibria. Ideally we would like to know that some relatively small set of well–
behaved strategies always contains at least one subgame perfect equilibrium. Notwith-
standing the fact that the set of behavior strategies in the games we consider is vastly
infinite, we will provide a procedure that determines a subgame perfect equilibrium in a
finite number of steps.
We start our analysis by restricting attention to pure action–independent strategies.
Action–independence says that the vote of a player is not conditioned on the votes pre-
viously cast, whether in the same round of voting or in the past. Thus in order to play
an action–independent strategy, a player need not remember how each individual player
has voted so far, but only what alternatives have been voted on, and in fact turned down,
so far. The condition of action–independence guarantees a degree of robustness of our
result with respect to the precise specification of the voting stage of the game. In the
basic model described above, the voting order is exogenously given and is fixed throughout
the game, and players observe all previously taken actions. Under action–independence,
however, each of these assumptions can be relaxed. Our existence result extends without
any difficulty to a more general model where the voting order is history–dependent and/or
probabilistic, and information on previously cast votes might be incomplete.
Under action–independence, the play of the game can be conveniently summarized by
a so–called collective strategy. A collective strategy describes whether, after each history
of alternatives generated by nature, the current proposal must be accepted or rejected. In
particular, a collective strategy tells us how to continue the play of the game following a
deviation, i.e. a rejection of an alternative that, according to the collective strategy, should
have been accepted. We refer to such a deviation as an “unlawful” rejection. We show how
to construct strategies for the players from a given collective strategy and how the concept
of subgame perfect equilibrium can be reformulated in terms of collective strategies, leading
to the concept of collective equilibrium.
A collective strategy is said to be simple if an unlawful rejection of a given alternative
at any point in the game triggers the same continuation play. A simple collective strategy
can thus be described by a relatively small amount of data: namely, the main game–plan
according to which the game will be played until the first unlawful rejection occurs, and
for every alternative a continuation game–plan that will be played following an unlawful
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rejection of the given alternative.
A particular example of a simple collective strategy is a stationary collective strategy.
A stationary collective strategy consists of some target set of alternatives that are deemed
acceptable. As soon as nature generates an alternative from the target set, it is accepted.
More general than a stationary collective strategy is a collective strategy that is induced by
stationary game–plans, since each unlawfully rejected alternative may lead to a particular
set of alternatives that is targeted next. However, we show that a collective equilibrium
induced by stationary game–plans may not exist.
A two–step game–plan is only slightly more complicated than a stationary game–plan.
Instead of having one target set of alternatives, the players have two sets, a set of alter-
natives X1 and a larger set of alternatives X2. In a two–step game–plan, players wait m
periods for nature to select an alternative from X1. If no such alternative is chosen from
X1 in the first m rounds then, the players wait for an alternative from the set X2 to be
chosen. When the threshold m is equal to zero, a two–step game–plan is stationary.
Example 1.1: To motivate these definitions consider a three–player quitting game as
defined in Solan (2005). There are three alternatives called x1, x2, and x3, chosen by
nature with equal probability. If nature chooses xi, Player i decides whether to stop the
game or to continue. The payoffs are given in Table 1. For example, if nature chooses
alternative x1 and Player 1 decides to stop, Player 1 gets a payoff of 1, Player 2 a payoff
of 7, and Player 3 a payoff of 0. If the game never stops, all payoffs are zero.
x1 x2 x3
1 1 0 3
2 7 4 0
3 0 7 4
Table 1: A three–player quitting game.
The core of the game is empty as the preferences of the players exhibit a cycle: Player 1
prefers Player 3 to stop the game, Player 3 prefers Player 2 to stop it, and Player 2 prefers
Player 1 to do so. We will show in Section 4 that the game has no subgame perfect
stationary equilibria, whether in pure or mixed strategies, and in Section 8 that the game
has no collective equilibrium induced by stationary game–plans.
Now consider two game–plans, called g and h: g is the game–plan that says “always
stop” and h is the game–plan that says “in period 0, only stop if x2 is chosen, and in all
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subsequent periods only stop if x2 or x3 is chosen.” The game–plan g is stationary while
the game–plan h is two–step with a threshold of 1.
We recursively define the simple collective strategy f as follows. Start by following the
game–plan g. Keep following a game–plan until the first unlawful rejection occurs. After
an unlawful rejection of x1, erase the memory of play and follow game–plan h from scratch.
After an unlawful rejection of x2 or x3, erase the memory of play and follow game–plan g
from scratch.
The collective strategy f thus constructed is said to be induced by two–step game–
plans, with the game–plan g serving as both the main–game plan of f and the punishment
game–plan following an unlawful rejection of x2 and x3, and h serving as a punishment
game–plan following an unlawful rejection of x1. As we show in Section 8, the collective
strategy f corresponds to a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Our main result claims that there always is a collective equilibrium induced by two–step
game–plans. Moreover, we specify an iterative procedure that terminates in a finite number
of steps with the appropriate two–step game–plans. More precisely, the procedure yields a
set of acceptable alternatives and a set of viable game–plans. Acceptable alternatives are
precisely those alternatives that can be accepted in some collective equilibrium induced
by two–step game–plans, and viable game–plans are precisely those two–step game–plans
that can be used to induce such equilibria.
We also show how to specify an a priori upper bound on the threshold of two–step
game–plans, and how to construct a collective equilibrium that is induced by two–step
game–plans satisfying this upper bound. The importance of this refinement is that the
set of two–step game–plans satisfying this bound, as well as the strategies they induce,
is finite. We demonstrate that, unlike stationary equilibrium, our equilibrium concept is
generically robust to small perturbations in the dynamic process and in utilities.
We examine the class of games with three alternatives and an arbitrary number of
players that exhibits the Condorcet paradox: a decisive coalition of players prefers the
first alternative to the second, another decisive coalition of players the second alternative
to the third, and another decisive coalition prefers the third alternative to the first. The
example discussed before is a specific illustration. We show that collective equilibria have
the immediate acceptance property. The first alternative that is generated by nature is
accepted.
We also apply collective equilibrium to the Baron-Ferejohn model of redistributive
politics. In that model a stationary equilibrium does exist. We prove that the payoffs
sustained by collective equilibria induced by two–step game–plans converge to the payoffs of
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the stationary equilibrium when the units in which redistribution takes place are sufficiently
small.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model
and Section 3 establishes the one–shot deviation principle. Section 4 discusses stationary
strategies and the relation between equilibria in stationary strategies and the core. We
also discuss examples that admit no subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies
and examples where all stationary equilibria are in mixed strategies. Section 5 is devoted
to pure action–independent strategies, Sections 6 to collective strategies, Section 7 to simple
collective strategies, and Section 8 to two–step game–plans. Section 9 provides the main
result, a constructive proof of existence of a collective equilibrium induced by two–step
game–plans. Section 10 applies our solution concept to a class of examples exhibiting the
Condorcet paradox and Section 11 presents an application to the Baron-Ferejohn model of
redistributive politics. Section 12 demonstrates the robustness of our solution concept, and
Section 13 extends the results to an incomplete information setting. Finally, Section 14
concludes.
2 The model
We consider a dynamic game Γ = (N,X, µ0, µ, C, u). The set of players is N, a set with
cardinality n. In each period t = 0, 1, . . . nature draws an alternative x from a non–empty,
finite set X. In period 0 alternatives are selected according to the probability distribution
µ0 on X. In later periods, the selection of alternatives is governed by the Markov process
µ, where µ(y | x) denotes the probability that the current alternative is y conditional on
previous period’s alternative being x. To keep notation and proofs as simple as possible, we
assume that µ is irreducible, i.e. given any current alternative x there is positive probability
to reach any other alternative y at some point in the future.
After the selection of an alternative, all players vote sequentially, each player casting
a “y” or an “n” vote. For the sake of expositional simplicity, we assume that the order
of voting ≺ is independent of the history of play and that each player observes the entire
history of play preceding his own move, assumptions that can easily be avoided as we
demonstrate in an extended model in Section 13.
The correspondence C : X → 2N associates to each alternative x a collection of decisive
coalitions C(x), a collection of subsets of N. Alternative x is accepted if and only if the set
of players who vote “y” on x is a member of C(x). After the acceptance of an alternative,
the game ends. Otherwise, the game proceeds to the next time period. The collection C(x)
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is assumed to be non–empty and monotonic. If C ∈ C(x) and D ⊂ N is a superset of C,
then D ∈ C(x). In case ∅ ∈ C(x), alternative x corresponds to a breakdown alternative.
The monotonicity assumption on C(x) implies that, irrespective of the voting behavior of
the players, the game ends after a breakdown alternative is selected. We allow for the
existence of multiple breakdown alternatives.
Player i ∈ N has a utility function ui : X → R+, where ui(x) is the utility player
i derives from the implementation of alternative x. In case of perpetual disagreement,
every player’s utility is zero. The profile of utility functions (ui)i∈N is denoted by u.
Although players are assumed not to discount utilities, the equivalent model with a positive
probability 1 − δ of breakdown in every period is a special case of our model. It suffices
to specify that one of the alternatives x in X is a breakdown alternative which is selected
with probability 1− δ in every period and leads to utility u(x) = 0.
Let A = {y, n}N denote the set of players’ joint actions in a voting stage of the game.
The subset A∗(x) of A defined by
A∗(x) = {a ∈ A|{i ∈ N | ai = y} ∈ C(x)}
is the set of joint actions which leads to the acceptance of alternative x.
Let Hi be the set of all histories where player i makes a decision. We define Hi as
the set of all sequences (s0, a0, . . . , st−1, at−1, st, a
≺i
t ) where s0, . . . , st are alternatives in X,
a0, . . . , at−1 are the actions by the players in the voting stages 0, . . . , t − 1, and a
≺i
t is
an element of the set {y, n}≺i, where ≺ i = {j ∈ N | j ≺ i} is the set of players who
vote before player i. Notice that only sequences (s0, a0, . . . , st−1, at−1, st, a
≺i
t ) such that
µ0(s0) > 0, ak /∈ A
∗(sk) for every k ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1}, and µ(sk+1 | sk) > 0 for every
k ∈ {0, . . . , t− 1} can occur with positive probability. A behavioral strategy for player i is
a function σi : Hi → [0, 1] where σi(h) is the probability for player i to play “y” at history
h ∈ Hi.
Three important special cases of the model are collective choice games, quitting games,
and coalition formation games.
Collective choice games are obtained as follows. Suppose that for every alternative x,
C(x) consists of all coalitions with at least q players. This represents a quota voting rule
with q being the size of the majority required for the approval of an alternative. Under this
specification of decisive coalitions and µ being such that proposals are drawn from a fixed
probability distribution in each period, our model is the discrete analogue of the model of
Compte and Jehiel (2010a). It is also closely related to the model of Banks and Duggan
(2000) once proposals are generated by an exogenous dynamic process rather than chosen
endogenously by a recognized player.
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In the simple example of a quitting game with perfect information as defined in Solan
and Vieille (2001), we have X = {x1, . . . , xn}, µ(xi) = 1/n for every i ∈ N , and C(xi) =
{C ⊂ N |i ∈ C}. In this case an alternative xi is accepted if and only if player i votes in
favor of acceptance.
Bloch and Diamantoudi (2011) consider coalition formation in hedonic games. The
formation of a coalition C ∈ 2N \{∅} leads to utilities ui(C) for the members of coalition C
and to utility zero for players inN\C. The variation on the game of Bloch and Diamantoudi
(2011) where the game ends as soon as the first coalition forms and where nature chooses the
coalition rather than the proposer is a special case of our set–up. It is obtained by choosing
the non–empty coalitions as the alternatives and the collection of decisive coalitions for
alternative C given by C(C) = {D ⊂ N | D ⊃ C}.
More generally, since our set of decisive coalitions is allowed to depend on the alterna-
tive, we can also interpret our set–up as a coalition formation game. Let X(C) denote the
subset of alternatives in X for which C ∈ C(x). Then u(X(C)) corresponds to the payoff
set of coalition C. Compared to standard models of non-transferable utility games, our
approach also specifies the payoffs to non–coalition members, so externalities are allowed
for. Our monotonicity assumption on C leads to a monotonicity assumption on the sets of
payoffs: if u¯ ∈ u(X(C)) and C ⊂ D, then u¯ ∈ u(X(D)).
The game Γ belongs to the class of stochastic games with perfect information and
recursive payoffs. These are stochastic games where each state is controlled by one player,
the payoffs in the transient states are all zero, and the payoffs in the absorbing states
are non–negative. The main result in Flesch, Kuipers, Schoenmakers, and Vrieze (2010)
states that Γ has a subgame perfect ǫ–equilibrium in pure strategies for every ǫ > 0. As is
explained in detail in the following sections, we exploit the special features of the game Γ
to obtain significantly stronger results.
3 The one–shot deviation principle
The one–shot deviation principle claims that a joint strategy σ = (σi)i∈N is a subgame
perfect equilibrium if and only if no player i has a strategy σ′i such that σ
′
i agrees with
σi after all histories in Hi except some history h, and conditional on history h, σ
′
i yields
player i a higher payoff against σ−i than σi. A strategy σ
′
i as above is said to be a profitable
one–shot deviation from σ. It is well–known that the one–shot deviation principle holds
in any dynamic game where the payoff function is continuous at infinity, see for instance
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Theorem 4.2. Unfortunately, the payoff function in our game
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Γ is not continuous at infinity. Nevertheless, as demonstrated below, our game does satisfy
the one–shot deviation principle.
Let a joint strategy σ and a history h ∈ Hi be given. We let π(t, x | σ, h) denote the
probability that the play of the game will terminate in period t with the acceptance of
alternative x, conditional on the fact that history h has taken place. The expected payoff
of player i conditional on history h is given by
vi(σ | h) =
∑
x∈X
ui(x)
∞∑
t=0
π(t, x | σ, h).
A joint strategy σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game Γ if for every player i,
each history h ∈ Hi, and each strategy σ
′
i it holds that
vi(σ
′
i, σ−i | h) ≤ vi(σi, σ−i | h).
Theorem 3.1: (The one–shot deviation principle) A joint strategy σ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of Γ if and only if for every player i, each h′ ∈ Hi, and each strategy σ
′
i such
that σ′i(h) = σi(h) for every h ∈ Hi \ {h
′}, it holds that
vi(σ
′
i, σ−i | h
′) ≤ vi(σi, σ−i | h
′).
The “only if” part of the theorem is trivial. The lemma below is a crucial step towards
the proof of the “if” part. The result claims that if a player i can improve upon his payoff
obtained under σ, he can do so by deviating from σ at finitely many histories in Hi only.
Let σi and σ
′
i be strategies for player i. For each k ∈ N, we define the strategy σ
k
i
for player i by the following rule: The strategy σki agrees with σ
′
i for histories h ∈ Hi in
periods 0, . . . , k, and agrees with σi for histories h ∈ Hi in periods k+1, k+2, . . .. Formally,
for a history h = (s0, a0, . . . , st−1, at−1, st, a
≺i
t ) in Hi, set σ
k
i (h) = σ
′
i(h) if t ≤ k and set
σki (h) = σi(h) otherwise.
Lemma 3.2: Let σi and σ
′
i be strategies for player i and let σ−i be a tuple of strategies for
the other players. Suppose that for some h ∈ Hi we have that
vi(σ
′
i, σ−i | h) > vi(σi, σ−i | h).
Then there exists a k ∈ N such that
vi(σ
k
i , σ−i | h) > vi(σi, σ−i | h).
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Proof: We write σ = (σi, σ−i), σ
′ = (σ′i, σ−i), and σ
k = (σki , σ−i). Choose ǫ > 0 such that
vi(σ
′ | h) > vi(σ | h) + ǫ. Choose c > 0 such that for every i ∈ N, x ∈ X, it holds that
ui(x) ≤ c. Let th denote the time period of history h. The sum
∞∑
t=th
∑
x∈X
π(t, x | σ′, h)
is the probability that the game eventually ends with the acceptance of some alternative,
and hence is bounded from above by 1. Therefore, there is a time period k ≥ th such that
∞∑
t=k+1
∑
x∈X
π(t, x | σ′, h) ≤
ǫ
c
and it holds that
vi(σ
′ | h)−
k∑
t=th
∑
x∈X
ui(x)π(t, x | σ
′, h) =
∞∑
t=k+1
∑
x∈X
ui(x)π(t, x | σ
′, h) ≤ ǫ.
Since the joint strategies σk and σ′ agree on all histories up to and including period k, we
have π(t, x | σk, h) = π(t, x | σ′, h) whenever th ≤ t ≤ k. Hence
vi(σ
k | h) ≥
k∑
t=th
∑
x∈X
ui(x)π(t, x | σ
k, h)
=
k∑
t=th
∑
x∈X
ui(x)π(t, x | σ
′, h) ≥ vi(σ
′ | h)− ǫ > vi(σ | h),
where the first inequality follows since u(x) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ X . 
The one–shot deviation principle can now be derived using a standard technique.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Suppose there is a player i, a history h ∈ Hi, and a strategy
σ′i such that
vi(σ
′
i, σ−i | h) > vi(σi, σ−i | h).
By Lemma 3.2 there exists k such that vi(σ
k
i , σ−i | h) > vi(σi, σ−i | h). Either there is a
history h′ in period k where player i has a profitable one–shot deviation from σi, or
vi(σ
k−1
i , σ−i | h) > vi(σi, σ−i | h).
This process terminates in finitely many steps with a history where player i has a profitable
one–shot deviation.
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4 Stationary strategies
It has been shown in Fink (1964), Takahashi (1964), and Sobel (1971) that a stochas-
tic game with discounting admits a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies.
When at least one of the alternatives in our model is a breakdown alternative, the tech-
niques of the stochastic game literature with discounting can be used to show the existence
of a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies. However, it is well-known that
even in the presence of discounting, subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies
may not exist.
In the absence of discounting, even when allowing for mixed strategies, non–existence of
a Nash equilibrium has been noted by Blackwell and Ferguson (1968) and obviously implies
the non–existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies. This result
has spurred an extensive literature on the existence of weaker notions of Nash equilibrium
in special classes of stochastic games with the average reward criterion. An example is the
class of recursive games with positive payoffs as introduced in Flesch et al. (2010), a class
for which they show the existence of a subgame perfect ǫ–equilibrium in pure strategies.
Since our model belongs to the class of recursive games with positive payoffs, this result
immediately applies.
We study next whether Γ has subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. We
say that a strategy is stationary if the probability to vote in favor of a given alternative x
depends only on x and is otherwise independent of the history of play.1
Definition 4.1: A strategy σi for player i is stationary if for all histories h = (s0, a0, . . . ,
st−1, at−1, st, a
≺i
t ) and h
′ = (s′0, a
′
0, . . . , s
′
t′−1, a
′
t′−1, s
′
t′ , a
′≺i
t′ ) in Hi such that st = s
′
t′ it holds
that σi(h) = σi(h
′).
Let x and y be alternatives in X . The alternative x is said to strictly dominate y if
{i ∈ N |ui(x) > ui(y)} ∈ C(x).
Notice that under the maintained assumptions it is possible that x strictly dominates y
while at the same time y strictly dominates x. The set of alternatives that strictly dominate
y is denoted by SD(y). An alternative x is said to have the core property if it is not strictly
dominated by any other alternative. The core consists of all alternatives with the core
1Our notion of stationary is somewhat more stringent than the usual one in the literature. Following
the approach in Maskin and Tirole (2001) would lead to a notion of stationarity where the voting decision
of a player is allowed to depend on the votes cast previously in the current round of voting. Our negative
results regarding the existence of stationary equilibria carry over to this weaker notion of stationarity.
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property. Our definition of the core equals the one as given for effectivity functions, see
Definition 5.2.5 of Peleg and Peters (2010).
For non-transferable utility games, the core is defined in terms of utilities rather than
alternatives, and more precisely as those utilities u¯ ∈ u(X(N)) for which there is no C ⊂ N
with uˆ ∈ u(X(C)) such that uˆi > u¯i for all i ∈ C. The monotonicity property of C implies
the consistency of our definition of the core with the one in the theory on non–transferable
utility games.
It follows directly from the definition that a breakdown alternative strictly dominates
any alternative including itself. Non–emptiness of the core therefore implies the absence
of breakdown alternatives.
Let Γ have a non-empty core, and let x¯ ∈ X be an alternative with the core property.
We define the following pure stationary strategy for player i ∈ N :
σi(s0, a0, . . . , st−1, at−1, st, a
≺i
t ) =

y, if st = x¯ or ui(st) > ui(x¯),n, otherwise. (4.1)
Under the joint strategy σ, all players vote in favor of alternative x¯, and since C(x¯) is
non-empty and monotonic, x¯ is accepted whenever drawn by nature.
Theorem 4.2: Let Γ have a non-empty core. The joint strategy σ as defined in (4.1) is a
subgame perfect equilibrium in pure stationary strategies.
Proof: Let x¯ ∈ X be an alternative with the core property. We define the pure stationary
strategy σi for player i ∈ N by (4.1). Under the joint strategy σ, it clearly holds that x¯ is
accepted whenever drawn by nature.
Suppose there is another alternative, say x, which is accepted when drawn by nature.
By definition of σ it holds that {i ∈ N | ui(x) > ui(x¯)} ∈ C(x), which means that x strictly
dominates x¯, a contradiction. Consequently, x¯ is the only alternative that will ever be
accepted.
Since µ is irreducible and x¯ is the only alternative that will ever be accepted, it holds
that v(σ) = u(x¯). Moreover, the expected utility to the players following the rejection of
any alternative is given by u(x¯).
We verify next that there are no profitable one–shot deviations from σ. Consider a
history h at which, according to σ, player i has to vote in favor of an alternative x. By
definition of σ it holds that ui(x) ≥ ui(x¯). When the play resulting from σ leads to the
acceptance of x, we have that vi(σ | h) = ui(x), whereas a one-shot deviation by player
i to a vote against either still results in the acceptance of x, or to a rejection and utility
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ui(x¯) ≤ ui(x), so is not profitable. When playing according to σ leads to the rejection of
x, a one-shot deviation by player i to a vote against will still lead to the rejection of x
by monotonicity of C(x), and is therefore not profitable. Consider a history h at which,
according to σ, player i has to vote against an alternative x. By definition of σ we have
that ui(x) ≤ ui(x¯). By monotonicity of C(x), a one–shot deviation by player i to a vote in
favor will either not make a difference or change a rejection of x into an acceptance and
lead to utility ui(x) ≤ ui(x¯), so is not profitable.
By Theorem 3.1 we conclude that σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
The following example of a collective choice game illustrates that even when the core is
non-empty, there may be subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies leading
to the acceptance of an alternative that does not belong to the core. In fact, even in the
presence of an alternative that is unanimously preferred to all other alternatives, some of
the other alternatives might be accepted.
Example 4.3: There are 3 players and 4 alternatives with payoffs given by Table 2 on
the left. The collection of decisive coalitions consists of all coalitions with two or more
players, so is obtained by an application of simple majority rule. In every time period,
all alternatives have an equal chance to be selected by nature. Notice that alternative
x4 is strictly preferred by all players to any other alternative. The alternative x4 has the
core property and Theorem 4.2 implies that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure
stationary strategies where an alternative is accepted by a majority if and only if it is
alternative x4. However, there is another subgame perfect equilibrium in pure stationary
strategies given by Table 2 on the right. In this equilibrium all four alternatives are
immediately accepted, resulting in an expected payoff of 15/4 for every player. Since
15/4 < 4 and 4 is the minimum utility of a player who casts a yes vote, it is easy to verify
that the one-shot deviation principle is satisfied, and the strategy is a subgame perfect
equilibrium indeed. 
x1 x2 x3 x4
1 5 4 0 6
2 0 5 4 6
3 4 0 5 6
x1 x2 x3 x4
1 y y n y
2 n y y y
3 y n y y
Table 2: Payoffs and strategies in Example 4.3.
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x1 x2 x3
1 1 0 3
2 7 4 0
3 0 7 4
Table 3: Payoffs in Example 4.4.
The following two examples illustrate that when Γ has an empty core, there might not
be a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed stationary strategies. The first example corre-
sponds to a quitting game, the second example is a collective choice game that exhibits the
Condorcet paradox. The second example can also be reformulated as a coalition formation
game. This example is closely related to an example on coalition formation where Bloch
(1996) shows non-existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies.
Example 4.4: This is an example of a 3–player quitting game with perfect information as
studied in Solan (2005). The set of players is N = {1, 2, 3} and the set of alternatives is
X = {x1, x2, x3}. The utilities of these alternatives are specified in Table 3. In every time
period, every alternative is chosen by nature with probability 1/3. Player i is decisive for
alternative xi, that is C(xi) = {C ⊂ N | i ∈ C}. It holds that x3 strictly dominates x1, x1
strictly dominates x2, and x2 strictly dominates x3, so the core of the game is empty, and
Theorem 4.2 cannot be applied.
In this example, a stationary strategy of player i can be represented by a number
αi ∈ [0, 1], being the probability for player i to vote in favor of alternative xi. In a stationary
strategy, the vote of player i on the other alternatives is inconsequential, and can therefore
be ignored. For i ∈ N, it holds that vi(0, 0, 0) = 0 and
vi(α) =
1
α1 + α2 + α3
(α1ui(x1) + α2ui(x2) + α3ui(x3)), α 6= (0, 0, 0).
By stationarity, v(α) = (v1(α), v2(α), v3(α)) is also the expected utility conditional on the
rejection of any alternative. By Theorem 3.1 it holds that the joint stationary strategy α
is subgame perfect if and only if for every player i
αi > 0 implies ui(xi) ≥ vi(α),
αi < 1 implies ui(xi) ≤ vi(α).
We claim that the game has no subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies.
For suppose α is such a strategy. We split the argument into four cases depending on the
number m of non–zero components of α.
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Case m = 0. We have that α = (0, 0, 0) and v(α) = (0, 0, 0). Since u1(x1) = 1 > 0 =
v1(α), we must have α1 = 1, a contradiction.
Case m = 1. Suppose first that α1 > 0. It follows that v(α) = u(x1). But then
u3(x3) = 4 > 0 = v3(α) and so we must have α3 = 1, implying that m ≥ 2. Similarly, if
α2 > 0 a contradiction arises since v(α) = u(x2) and u1(x1) = 1 > 0 = v1(α), and if α3 > 0
a contradiction arises since v(α) = u(x3) and u2(x2) = 4 > 0 = v2(α).
Case m = 2. Suppose first that α3 = 0. Then v(α) is a strictly convex combination
of u(x1) and u(x2) and hence v2(α) > u2(x2). Hence α2 = 0, implying that m ≤ 1, a
contradiction. Similarly, if α2 = 0 a contradiction arises since v1(α) > u1(x1), and if
α1 = 0 a contradiction arises since v3(α) > u3(x3).
Case m = 3. We have α1, α2, α3 > 0 and so
ui(xi) ≥ vi(α) =
1
α1 + α2 + α3
(α1ui(x1) + α2ui(x2) + α3ui(x3)), i ∈ N.
Rewriting leads to the inequalities
α3/α2 ≤ 1/2, α1/α3 ≤ 4/3, and α2/α1 ≤ 4/3,
and therefore
1 =
α3
α2
α1
α3
α2
α1
≤
1
2
·
4
3
·
4
3
=
8
9
,
a contradiction.
Example 4.5: All the primitives are the same as in the preceding example, except for
the collection of decisive coalitions. Suppose that the votes of two out of three players
are needed for the acceptance of an alternative, so C(x) consists of all subsets of N with
at least two players. This is an example of a Condorcet paradox, where the majority
induced preference relation is intransitive. In a pairwise comparison, alternative x1 beats
x2, alternative x2 beats x3, and alternative x3 beats x1. Herings and Houba (2010) study
this example under the alternative model where the proposer rather than the alternative
is selected by nature.
We claim that the game admits no subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strate-
gies. A stationary strategy of player i in this game specifies, for every alternative x, the
probability for player i to vote in favor of x.
Suppose the joint stationary strategy σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium. It is rather
straightforward, though tedious, to show that the cases where σ leads to the rejection of all
alternatives, or to the acceptance of at most one alternative with positive probability, are
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x0 x1 x2 x3
1 0 1 0 5
2 0 5 1 0
3 0 0 5 1
Table 4: Payoffs in Example 4.6.
not compatible with equilibrium. Equilibrium utilities are therefore strictly in between the
utility of the worst and the best alternative for every player. Next it is rather straightfor-
ward, though tedious as well, to show that each player votes in favor of his best alternative
and against his worst alternative with probability one.
Hence, in essence, every player i is decisive for alternative xi since there is one more
player who votes in favor of xi and one more who votes against it. Thus the joint sta-
tionary strategy σ induces a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game of Example 4.4,
contradicting the conclusion that no stationary subgame perfect equilibria exist in that
game. Consequently, no joint stationary strategy σ can be a subgame perfect equilibrium
in the game of Example 4.5.
Example 4.5 studies the case of majority voting in a three–player set–up with an empty
core, or equivalently, the absence of a Condorcet winner. It has been shown in the literature
that the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox is not an artifact. Work by Plott (1967),
Rubinstein (1979), Schofield (1983), Cox (1984), and Le Breton (1987) shows that the
core is generically empty in majority voting situations with three or more players in a
set–up where alternatives are a compact, convex subset of some Euclidean space. Such
voting situations can be approximated arbitrarily closely in our set–up with a finite set of
alternatives.
The next example of a quitting game shows that in the presence of a breakdown alter-
native, subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies may fail to exist, and that
subgame perfect equilibria in mixed stationary strategies, which do exist in this case, are
Pareto inefficient.
Example 4.6: In this example the set of players is N = {1, 2, 3} and the set of alternatives
is X = {x0, x1, x2, x3}. The utilities of these alternatives are specified in Table 4. Every
period a breakdown alternative x0 is selected with a probability 1− δ strictly in between 0
and 1. For the other alternatives it holds that player i is decisive for alternative xi, which
is selected with probability δ/3 in every period.
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In this example, a stationary strategy of player i can be represented by a number
αi ∈ [0, 1], being the probability for player i to vote in favor of alternative xi. In a stationary
strategy, the vote of player i on other alternatives is inconsequential, and can therefore be
ignored. For i ∈ N, it holds that
vi(α) =
1
3− 3δ + δα1 + δα2 + δα3
(δα1ui(x1) + δα2ui(x2) + δα3ui(x3)).
By stationarity, v(α) = (v1(α), v2(α), v3(α)) is also the expected utility conditional on the
rejection of any alternative. By Theorem 3.1 it holds that the joint stationary strategy α
is subgame perfect if and only if for every player i ∈ N,
αi > 0 implies ui(xi) ≥ vi(α),
αi < 1 implies ui(xi) ≤ vi(α).
It is a routine exercise to verify that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in
stationary strategies. If δ ≤ 1/2, then it is given by the pure strategy profile α1 = α2 =
α3 = 1 with expected payoffs v(α) = (2δ, 2δ, 2δ). If δ > 1/2, then it is given by the
mixed strategy profile α1 = α2 = α3 = (1 − δ)/δ with expected payoffs v(α) = (1, 1, 1),
irrespective of δ. A strategy profile that would lead to immediate acceptance of every
alternative has payoffs (2δ, 2δ, 2δ), which converges to (2, 2, 2) as δ tends to 1. The delay
in the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium causes substantial inefficiencies. The
expected delay before reaching an agreement is equal to (2δ − 1)/(2 − 2δ) periods, which
tends to infinity as δ tends to 1. In the limit, every alternative is rejected with probability
1.
5 Action–independence
The objective of this paper is to prove the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium
in the game Γ. Moreover, we would like to construct a subgame perfect equilibrium in
pure strategies that exhibits a relatively small amount of history–dependence and that
is computable in finitely many steps. To guarantee the existence of a subgame perfect
equilibrium, some history–dependence is needed as is evidenced by Examples 4.4 and 4.5.
Example 4.6 shows that even in the presence of breakdown alternatives, some history–
dependence is needed to guarantee the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure
strategies.
We will consider strategies that are pure and action–independent. A strategy is said
to be action–independent if it prescribes the same action after the same sequence of moves
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by nature. In other words, under action–independence a player is not allowed to condition
his vote on the actions of the players, but only on the moves by nature.
Definition 5.1: A strategy σi for player i is action–independent if for all histories h =
(s0, a0, . . . , st−1, at−1, st, a
≺i
t ) and h¯ = (s¯0, a¯0, . . . , s¯t−1, a¯t−1, s¯t, a¯
≺i
t ) in Hi such that s0 =
s¯0, . . . , st = s¯t, it holds that σi(h) = σi(h¯).
The requirement of action–independence guarantees the robustness of our solution with
respect to the exact set–up of the voting stage of the game. We presently assume that the
players vote on each proposal sequentially, that the order of voting is fixed, and that the
players observe all moves previously made. Action–independence implies that the order of
voting is inessential. Accordingly, our existence result carries over without any difficulty to
a game where the order of voting is random or history–dependent. Moreover, under action–
independence it is inessential whether the players are indeed able to observe previously cast
ballots or not. Consequently, our existence result extends to a game where the players have
various degrees of incomplete information about the voting behavior of other players. In
particular, we encompass the situation where the players cast their votes simultaneously
and the votes are not, partially, or completely disclosed at the end of the voting stage.
Section 13 presents the details for such an extension to incomplete information settings.
6 Collective strategies
Under action–independence, the play of the game can be conveniently summarized by
means of so–called collective strategies. A collective strategy is a complete contingent
plan of actions which specifies whether a given alternative has to be accepted or rejected,
following a given sequence of alternatives selected by nature.
Let S be the set of all finite sequences of elements ofX. A collective strategy is a function
f from S to {0, 1}, where 0 corresponds to a rejection and 1 to an acceptance. We define
f(s) for every element s ∈ S, so f also specifies how the game is played for counterfactual
situations where the game proceeds after the acceptance of an alternative. Let F be the
set of functions from S to {0, 1}.
Consider a joint strategy σ where σi is pure and action–independent for each player
i ∈ N. The collective strategy fσ : S → {0, 1} induced by σ is defined by
fσ(s0, . . . , st) =

1, if {i ∈ N | σi(s0, . . . , st) = y} ∈ C(st),0, otherwise. (6.1)
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Here we have used action–independence to treat σi as a function with domain S rather
than Hi. Thus fσ(s) = 1 if and only if s is accepted according to the joint strategy σ.
Notice that fσ(s) = 1 if st is a breakdown alternative, irrespective of the actual voting
behavior of the players.
Given some x ∈ X, we let Γx denote the game where the initial probability distribution
µ0 over X is defined by µ0(y) = µ(y|x), y ∈ X . We let Vx(f) denote the vector of expected
payoffs in the game Γx, if play proceeds according to the collective strategy f . We shall
often consider the case where the Markov process µ is stationary, that is µ(z|x) = µ(z|y)
for all x, y, and z. In this special case Vx(f) is clearly the same for each x ∈ X , and we
shall simply write V (f) to denote this common value.
Consider now a sequence s = (s0, . . . , st) of elements of X . It will be important to
compute the expected payoffs in the subgame that begins with a move of nature following
the rejection of the alternatives in the sequence s0, . . . , st. Notice that this subgame is
isomorphic to the game Γst. We let f [s] denote the continuation collective strategy after
the rejection of the alternatives in s. It is specified by
f [s](r) = f(s⊕ r), r ∈ S,
where s⊕ r is the concatenation of s and r. The expected payoffs after the rejection of the
sequence s0, . . . , st of alternatives are then given by Vst(f [s0, . . . , st]).
Example 6.1: Consider the profile σ of action–independent strategies given by (4.1). The
corresponding collective strategy fσ is given by fσ(s0, . . . , st) = 1 if and only if st ∈
{x¯} ∪ SD(x¯). If x¯ has the core property, then SD(x¯) is empty and Vx(fσ) = u(x¯) for every
x ∈ X . This equation holds since by our assumption the Markov process µ is irreducible,
so starting from any alternative x the process arrives at x¯ with non–zero probability. 
For f ∈ F, we define
SD(f) = {x ∈ X | {i ∈ N : ui(x) > Vx,i(f)} ∈ C(x)},
WD(f) = {x ∈ X | {i ∈ N : ui(x) ≥ Vx,i(f)} ∈ C(x)}.
The alternatives in SD(f) are said to strictly dominate the collective strategy f and those
in WD(f) are said to weakly dominate it. The alternative x strictly dominates f if a
decisive set of players prefers accepting x over rejecting it and playing the rest of the game
in accordance with the collective strategy f . The definition of strict dominance extends
the one in Section 4: The alternative x strictly dominates the alternative y if and only if x
strictly dominates the collective strategy f defined by setting f(s0, . . . , st) = 1 if and only
if st = y. This equivalence holds because in this case Vx(f) = u(y).
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We now present a notion of equilibrium that is in terms of collective strategies only.
Definition 6.2: The collective strategy f ∈ F is a collective equilibrium if for every
sequence s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S it holds that
st ∈ SD(f [s]) implies f(s) = 1, (6.2)
st /∈WD(f [s]) implies f(s) = 0. (6.3)
Notice that a breakdown alternative is never rejected in a collective equilibrium as a
breakdown alternative strictly dominates any collective strategy. The next result shows
that a collective equilibrium induces a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure action–
independent strategies.
Theorem 6.3: Let f ∈ F be a collective equilibrium. Then the pure action–independent
joint strategy defined for i ∈ N and s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S by
σi(s) =


y, if ui(st) > Vst,i(f [s]),
y, if ui(st) = Vst,i(f [s]) and f(s) = 1,
n, otherwise,
(6.4)
is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game Γ with fσ = f.
Proof: We verify that fσ = f . Consider some s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S and let C = {i ∈ N |
σi(s) = y} be the set of players voting in favor after the sequence s.
In case f(s) = 1, we have by definition of σ that C = {i ∈ N | ui(st) ≥ Vst,i(f [s])}. By
(6.3) it holds that st ∈WD(f [s]), so C belongs to C(st). We conclude that fσ(s) = 1.
In case f(s) = 0, we have by definition of σ that C = {i ∈ N | ui(st) > Vst,i(f [s])}.
By (6.2) it holds that st /∈ SD(f [s]) which means that C does not belong to C(st). We
conclude that fσ(s) = 0.
It is straightforward to verify that the joint strategy σ satisfies the one–shot deviation
property. We invoke Theorem 3.1 to conclude that the joint strategy σ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium. 
The next result shows that any subgame perfect equilibrium in pure action–independent
strategies induces a collective equilibrium.
Theorem 6.4: Let σ be a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ in pure action–independent
strategies. Then fσ is a collective equilibrium.
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Proof: Let f = fσ. We show first that Condition (6.2) holds. Let s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S be
such that st ∈ SD(f [s]). If st is a breakdown alternative, then f(s) = 1, so Condition (6.2)
holds. Consider the case where st is not a breakdown alternative. Suppose that f(s) = 0.
Since st ∈ SD(f [s]), the set of players C = {i ∈ N | ui(st) > Vst,i(f [s])} belongs to C(st).
Now label the players in C as {i1, . . . , im}, where i1 ≺ · · · ≺ im. For i ∈ N, let ai = σi(s)
and a = (a1, . . . , an). Consider the action profiles a
0, a1, . . . , am where a0 = a and, for
every k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, we define
aki =

y, if i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik},ai, otherwise.
Since by our supposition the strategy σ results in the rejection of alternative st, we have
a0 /∈ A∗(st). On the other hand, since a
m
i = y for every i ∈ C and since C ∈ C(st), we
have that am ∈ A∗(st). Let k
∗ be the least integer for which ak
∗
∈ A∗(st), and let i
∗ = ik∗ .
Notice that σi∗(s) = ai∗ = n for otherwise it would be the case that a
k∗−1 = ak
∗
, which
contradicts the choice of k∗.
Consider now any history h in Hi∗ where the sequence of alternatives is s and the vote
of players i ≺ i∗ in period t is equal to ak
∗
i . Since σ is action–independent, an n–vote by
player i∗ at h leads to the action profile ak
∗−1 in period t and hence to the rejection of
st. A y–vote by i
∗ at h leads to the action profile ak
∗
and hence to the acceptance of st.
Since ui∗(st) > Vst,i∗(f [s]), subgame perfection requires that player i
∗ cast a y–vote at h,
whereas σi∗(s) = n, a contradiction.
We now prove that Condition (6.3) holds. Let s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S be such that
st /∈ WD(f [s]). It follows that st is not a breakdown alternative. Suppose that f(s) = 1.
Since st /∈WD(f [s]), the set C = {i ∈ N | ui(st) < Vst,i(f [s])} has a non-empty intersection
with every member of C(st). Now label the players in C as {i1, . . . , im}, where i1 ≺ · · · ≺ im.
For i ∈ N, let ai = σi(s) and a = (a1, . . . , an). Consider the action profiles a
0, a1, . . . , am
where a0 = a and, for every k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, we define
aki =

n, if i ∈ {i1, . . . , ik},ai, otherwise.
Since by our supposition the strategy σ results in the acceptance of alternative st, we have
a0 ∈ A∗(st). On the other hand, since a
m
i = n for every i ∈ C and the intersection of C
with every member of C(st) is non-empty, we have that a
m /∈ A∗(st). Let k
∗ be the least
integer for which ak
∗
/∈ A∗(st), and let i
∗ = ik∗ . Notice that σi∗(s) = ai∗ = y for otherwise
it would be the case that ak
∗−1 = ak
∗
, which contradicts the choice of k∗.
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Consider now any history h in Hi∗ where the sequence of alternatives is s and the vote
of players i ≺ i∗ in period t is equal to ak
∗
i . Since σ is action–independent, a y–vote by
player i∗ at h leads to the action profile ak
∗−1 in period t and hence to the acceptance of
st. An n–vote by i
∗ at h leads to the action profile ak
∗
and hence to the rejection of st.
Since ui∗(st) < Vst,i∗(f [s]), subgame perfection requires that player i
∗ cast an n–vote at h,
whereas σi∗(s) = y, a contradiction. 
As a consequence of Theorems 6.3 and 6.4, we can perform our analysis using col-
lective rather than individual strategies. We refer to members of S as collective histories.
Individual strategies can be recovered from a given collective strategy using Equation (6.4).
7 Simple collective strategies
Consider a tuple F = (fj : j ∈ {0} ∪ X) consisting of the collective strategy f0 and, for
every x ∈ X, a collective strategy fx. We define a new collective strategy f as follows.
Consider some sequence of alternatives s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S. Follow the collective strategy
f0 until the first time t
0 such that f0(s0, . . . , st0) = 1. If such a t
0 does not exist or t0 = t,
then define f(s) = f0(s). Otherwise, switch to the collective strategy fs
t0
and delete the
history (s0, . . . , st0). Follow the collective strategy fs
t0
until the first time t1 such that
fs
t0
(st0+1, . . . , st1) = 1. If such a t
1 does not exist or t1 = t, then define f(s) = fs
t0
(s).
Otherwise, switch to the collective strategy fs
t1
, and so on. Notice that switches occur
after “unlawful” rejections, where instead of an acceptance a rejection has taken place.
The collective strategy f thus constructed is said to be induced by the tuple F . A
collective strategy is said to be simple if it is induced by some tuple F of strategies. This
terminology is motivated by the resemblance of our definition to that in Abreu (1988), see
the discussion at the end of this section.
The formal definition of a collective strategy f induced by F is by induction on the
length of the sequence of alternatives. Define f(x) = f0(x) for each x ∈ X . Now suppose
that f has already been defined on each sequence of alternatives of length less than or
equal to t. Consider a sequence s = (s0, . . . , st) of length t+ 1. Let
K(s) = {k ∈ {0, . . . , t− 1} | f(s0, . . . , sk) = 1}
and define
f(s0, . . . , st) =

f0(s0, . . . , st), if K(s) = ∅,fsk(sk+1, . . . , st), if K(s) 6= ∅ and k = maxK(s).
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t 0 1 2 3 4 5
st x1 x3 x1 x2 x1 x1
f(s0, . . . , st) 1 0 0 1 1 0
Table 5: The collective strategy f.
The following example illustrates our definitions.
Example 7.1: Let X = {x1, x2, x3}. Consider the collective strategies g and h where
g(s) = 1 for every s ∈ S and
h(s0, . . . , st) =

1, if [t = 0 and s0 = x2] or [t ≥ 1 and st ∈ {x2, x3}],0, otherwise.
Consider now the tuple (f0, fx1 , fx2, fx3) = (g, h, g, g) and let f be the induced simple
collective strategy. Some of the values of f are given by Table 5. To derive these values, we
reason as follows. Each alternative is accepted according to the collective strategy f0 = g,
hence f(x1) = 1. If x1 is rejected instead, we switch to the collective strategy fx1 = h.
According to h only x2 is initially accepted, so f(x1, x3) = 0. After the first round, only
x2 and x3 are accepted according to h, therefore f(x1, x3, x1) = 0 and f(x1, x3, x1, x2) = 1.
If x2 is rejected, we switch to the collective strategy fx2 = g according to which each
alternative is accepted, hence f(x1, x3, x1, x2, x1) = 1. If x1 is rejected we switch to fx1 = h.
Since according to h only x2 is initially accepted we have f(x1, x3, x1, x2, x1, x1) = 0. 
A game–plan corresponds to that part of a collective strategy f that is to be followed
until the first deviation from f occurs. More precisely, the game–plan P (f) of the collective
strategy f is defined as the set of sequences (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S such that there is no k ∈
{0, . . . , t − 1} with f(s0, . . . , sk) = 1. The payoffs of a collective strategy depend only on
the game–plan. Formally, if f and f ′ are collective strategies with P (f) = P (f ′), then
Vx(f) = Vx(f
′) for each x ∈ X .
The following lemma is obvious from the definition of an induced collective strategy. It
will be helpful for computing the payoffs of a simple collective strategy.
Lemma 7.2: Let the collective strategy f be induced by F = (fj : j ∈ {0}∪X) and consider
s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S. Then
1. P (f) = P (f0).
2. If f(s) = 1, then P (f [s]) = P (fst).
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3. If f(s) = 0 and K(s) = ∅, then P (f [s]) = P (f0[s]).
4. If f(s) = 0, K(s) 6= ∅, and k = maxK(s), then P (f [s]) = P (fsk [sk+1, . . . , st]).
In particular, the collective strategy f is completely characterized by the tuple of game–
plans (P (fj) : j ∈ {0} ∪X). We have the following corollary.
Corollary 7.3: Let F = (fj : j ∈ {0}∪X) and G = (gj : j ∈ {0}∪X). If P (fj) = P (gj)
for each j ∈ {0} ∪X, then the collective strategy induced by F equals that induced by G.
In view of this observation we shall say that the collective strategy f is induced by a
tuple of game–plans, rather than a tuple of collective strategies. The game–plan P (f0) =
P (f) is said to be the main game–plan of the collective strategy f . An unlawful rejection
of an alternative x triggers the punishment game–plan P (fx).
Notwithstanding the completely different context under consideration, our notion of
simplicity bears some resemblance to the one of Abreu (1988), Definition 1. Abreu (1988)
defines a simple strategy in a repeated game by a collection of paths, the main path and
n punishments paths, one for every player. A path is a sequence of actions in a stage
game and corresponds to our concept of a game–plan. A simple strategy is then defined as
follows: the main path is to be followed until the first unilateral deviation, and a unilateral
deviation by player i at any point in the game triggers the corresponding punishment path
of play. By comparison, in our definition of simplicity, the punishment game–plan does not
depend on the identity of the deviating player, but rather on what alternative has been
unlawfully rejected.
8 Two–step game–plans
In this section we consider collective strategies that are induced by two–step game–plans.
Before we proceed with the definition of a two–step game–plan, we explore the simpler,
and more restrictive, condition that the collective strategy be induced by stationary game–
plans.
Definition 8.1: For every Y ⊂ X, the collective strategy fY is defined by setting, for
every s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S,
fY (s) =

1, if st ∈ Y,0, otherwise.
A collective strategy f ∈ F is stationary if f = fY for some Y ⊂ X.
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The definition of a stationary collective strategy f in Definition 8.1 is consistent with
the definition of a stationary strategy σ in Definition 4.1 in the sense that the pure action–
independent joint strategy σ derived from a stationary collective strategy f by means of
(6.4) is stationary, and a stationary strategy σ induces a stationary collective strategy fσ.
A stationary collective strategy is easily seen to be simple.
Definition 8.2: A collective strategy f is induced by stationary game–plans if it is induced
by a tuple F = (fj : j ∈ {0} ∪X) where each fj is stationary.
Notice that a collective strategy induced by stationary game–plans need not be sta-
tionary itself. We show that the game of Example 4.6 has a collective equilibrium induced
by stationary game–plans.
Example 8.3: Consider Example 4.6. When δ ≤ 1/2, we have already derived that there
is a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure stationary strategies where all alternatives are
accepted.
We consider next the case where δ > 1/2. Consider the collective strategy f induced
by the tuple of game–plans
(f0, fx0 , fx1, fx2, fx3) = (fX , fX , f{x0,x1,x2}, f{x0,x2,x3}, f{x0,x1,x3}).
Under the collective strategy f, every alternative is accepted in period 0 and the breakdown
alternative x0 is accepted in every period. Suppose, for some i = 1, 2, 3, alternative xi is
unlawfully rejected. The punishment game–plan P (fxi) is such that the most attractive
alternative xi−1 for player i is no longer accepted.
According to Definition 6.2, f ∈ F is a collective equilibrium in the game of Example
4.6 if for every sequence s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S, where st = xi, it holds that f(s) = 1 if i = 0,
and for i = 1, 2, 3 it holds that
ui(xi) > Vi(f [s]) implies f(s) = 1, (8.1)
ui(xi) < Vi(f [s]) implies f(s) = 0. (8.2)
To verify Condition (8.1), suppose f(s) = 0. Assume first that st = x1. This means
that the punishment game–plan P (fx2) is being followed. Since fx2 is stationary, we find
that V1(f [s]) = V1(fx2) = 5δ/(3− δ) > 1 = u1(x1), where the first equality uses part 4 of
Lemma 7.2 and the inequality uses the fact that δ > 1/2. The cases where st = x2 and
st = x3 are similar.
To verify Condition (8.2), suppose f(s) = 1. We have that Vi(f [s]) = Vi(fxi) =
δ/(3− δ) < 1 = ui(xi), where the first equation uses part 2 of Lemma 7.2.
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Example 4.6 demonstrates that the unique stationary equilibrium is in mixed strategies,
has payoffs (1, 1, 1) irrespective of the value of δ, and leads to inefficiency because of delay,
which tends to infinity as δ goes to 1. The collective equilibrium constructed here has
immediate acceptance and Pareto efficient payoffs V (f) = (2δ, 2δ, 2δ). 
We show next that the game of Example 4.4 admits no collective equilibrium induced
by stationary game–plans. We define the carrier car(f) of f as the set of alternatives
x ∈ X for which there exists a sequence s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S such that st = x and f(s) = 1.
Example 8.4: According to Definition 6.2, f ∈ F is a collective equilibrium in the game
of Example 4.4 if for every sequence s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S, where st = xi, it holds that
ui(xi) > Vi(f [s]) implies f(s) = 1, (8.3)
ui(xi) < Vi(f [s]) implies f(s) = 0. (8.4)
Let f be a collective equilibrium. We show that Vi(f) > 0 for each player i. For suppose
that Vi(f) = 0 for some i ∈ N . We must then have f(xi) = 0 and Vi(f [xi]) = 0, where the
first equality follows from ui(xi) > 0. This contradicts Condition (8.3). For each s ∈ S,
since the collective strategy f [s] is a collective equilibrium, we have Vi(f [s]) > 0 for each
i ∈ N.
The fact that Vi(f) > 0 for each player i implies that car(f) contains at least two
alternatives. We argue next that x1 ∈ car(f). Suppose on the contrary, so car(f) =
{x2, x3}. Take any sequence s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S such that st = x3 and f(s) = 1. Condition
(8.4) implies that u3(x3) ≥ V3(f [s]). On the other hand since car(f [s]) ⊂ car(f) =
{x2, x3} and the cardinality of car(f [s]) equals 2, it holds that V3(f [s]) is a strictly convex
combination of u3(x2) and u3(x3), so V3(f [s]) > u(x3), a contradiction.
Now suppose f is induced by stationary game–plans. Let fx1 be given by fY for some
Y ⊂ X . Take any sequence s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S such that st = x1 and f(s) = 1. We
have V (f [s]) = V (fY ). Since Vi(fY ) > 0 for each i ∈ N, the set Y contains at least two
alternatives. By Condition (8.4) we have u1(x1) ≥ V1(f [s]) = V1(fY ). This inequality,
together with the fact that Y contains 2 or 3 alternatives implies that Y = {x1, x2} and in
particular that f(s⊕ x3) = 0. We obtain a contradiction since V3(f [s ⊕ x3]) = V3(fY ) =
7/2 < 4 = u3(x3), so by Condition (8.3) it should hold that f(s⊕ x3) = 1. 
Since the game of Example 4.4 has no collective equilibrium that is induced by station-
ary game–plans, we now shift our attention to a bigger set of collective strategies, the one
induced by two–step game–plans.
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Definition 8.5: For every X1 ⊂ X2 ⊂ X and for every non–negative integer m, the
collective strategy fX1,m,X2 is defined by setting, for every s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S,
f(s) =

1, if [t < m and st ∈ X
1] or [t ≥ m and st ∈ X
2],
0, otherwise.
A collective strategy f ∈ F is two–step if f = fX1,m,X2 for some X
1 ⊂ X2 ⊂ X and
non–negative integer m. The threshold of f is zero if X1 = X2 and is equal to the integer
m otherwise.
According to a two–step collective strategy, the players wait for nature to choose an
alternative from X1 in the first m periods; as soon as such an alternative is chosen by
nature, it is accepted. If no alternative from X1 is chosen in the first m periods, then the
players wait for an alternative from the bigger set X2.
Definition 8.6: A collective strategy f is induced by two–step game–plans if it is induced
by a tuple F = (fj : j ∈ {0} ∪X) where each fj is two–step.
Definition 8.7: The set of collective equilibria induced by two–step game–plans is denoted
by T.
Example 8.8: The collective strategy g = fX in Example 7.1 is stationary, while the col-
lective strategy h = f{x2},1,{x2,x3} is two–step with a threshold of 1. The collective strategy
f is therefore induced by two–step game–plans. We now show that f is a collective equi-
librium in the game Γ defined in Example 4.4, so for that example the set T is non–empty.
We verify that f satisfies Conditions (8.3) and (8.4).
Consider s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S such that f(s) = 1. Assume first that st ∈ {x2, x3}.
After the rejection of st, the play of the game continues in accordance with the collective
strategy g, hence V (f [s]) = V (g) = (4/3, 11/3, 11/3). For players i ∈ {2, 3}, we have
that ui(xi) = 4 > 11/3 = Vi(f [s]), so Condition (8.4) is satisfied. Now assume st = x1.
After the rejection of x1, the play of the game continues in accordance with the collective
strategy h which results in a payoff of 1 to player 1, thus u1(x1) = 1 = V1(h) = V1(f [s]).
This shows that Condition (8.4) is satisfied.
Now take some s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S such that f(s) = 0. Notice that rejections are only
prescribed by the punishment game–plan h. It follows that either we are in the first round
of h and st ∈ {x1, x3} or we are at least in the second round of h and st = x1. In either
case, the continuation play after s prescribes the acceptance of alternatives x2 and x3 and
the rejection of x1, so V (f [s]) = (3/2, 2, 11/2). We see that u1(x1) = 1 < 3/2 = V1(f [s])
and u3(x3) = 4 < 11/2 = V3(f [s]). Hence f satisfies Condition (8.3). 
28
9 Equilibria induced by two–step game–plans
We are now in a position to state the main result of the paper, which is that the game Γ
has a collective equilibrium f induced by two–step game–plans.
Theorem 9.1: The set T is non–empty.
In addition, our construction will be such that the main game–plan is not only two–step,
but even stationary.
The proof of the theorem consists of two parts. The first part can be thought of
as iterated elimination of unacceptable alternatives: We inductively reduce the set of
alternatives by eliminating those alternatives that cannot be accepted in any collective
equilibrium that is induced by two–step game–plans. The reduction of the set of acceptable
alternatives in turn results in the elimination of collective strategies that can be used as
punishment game–plans. At the end of this process we are left with a set of acceptable
alternatives, and, corresponding to each surviving alternative, a two–step game–plan that
is a suitable punishment game–plan following an unlawful rejection of that alternative.
The surviving alternatives will be called acceptable and surviving game–plans viable.
In the second part of the proof we use acceptable alternatives and viable game–plans to
construct a collective equilibrium in T . We also show that the set of acceptable alternatives
and of viable game–plans completely characterize the set T of collective equilibria.
Set Y0 = X . Define F0 to be the subset of F consisting of two–step collective strategies
f satisfying Condition (6.2): for each s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S, if st ∈ SD(f [s]) then f(s) = 1.
Notice that while a collective strategy in F0 satisfies Condition (6.2) of collective equi-
librium, it may well violate Condition (6.3). The set F0 contains fX , so is non–empty.
We now give a simple criterion to check whether a two–step collective strategy satisfies
Condition (6.2).
Lemma 9.2: Consider some X1, X2 ⊂ X with X1 ⊂ X2. For m = 0, 1, . . . define the
collective strategy gm = fX1,m,X2.
1. The collective strategy g0 satisfies Condition (6.2) if and only if SD(g0) ⊂ X
2.
2. Consider some non-negative integer m. The collective strategy gm+1 satisfies Condi-
tion (6.2) if and only if gm satisfies Condition (6.2) and SD(gm) ⊂ X
1.
Proof: To prove the first claim observe that g0 = fX2 . Consider s = (s0, . . . , st). It holds
that g0(s) = 1 if and only if st ∈ X
2. Since g0[s] = g0, the result follows at once.
29
To prove the second claim we notice that for each x ∈ X it holds that gm+1[x] = gm.
Moreover, for each sequence s = (s0, . . . , st) with t ≥ 1 we have gm+1(s) = gm(s1, . . . , st)
and gm+1[s] = gm[s1, . . . , st].
To prove the “only if” part assume gm+1 satisfies Condition (6.2). Consider some se-
quence (s1, . . . , st). If st ∈ SD(gm[s1, . . . , st]) then it holds that st ∈ SD(gm+1[s0, s1, . . . , st])
for every s0 ∈ X, so gm+1(s0, s1, . . . , st) = 1 and therefore gm(s1, . . . , st) = 1. We conclude
that gm satisfies Condition (6.2). If x ∈ SD(gm), then it holds that x ∈ SD(gm+1[x]), so
gm+1(x) = 1 and therefore x ∈ X
1.
We now prove the “if” part. Consider some s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S such that st ∈
SD(gm+1[s]). If t = 0, then it holds that s0 ∈ SD(gm), hence s0 ∈ X
1, and therefore
gm+1(s0) = 1. If t ≥ 1, then it holds that st ∈ SD(gm[s1, . . . , st]). Since gm satisfies (6.2)
we have gm(s1, . . . , st) = 1 and therefore gm+1(s) = 1. 
For every k ∈ N, we inductively define
Yk =
⋃
f∈Fk−1
WD(f),
Fk = {f ∈ F0 | car(f) ⊂ Yk}.
The alternatives for which there is a suitable punishment game–plan in Fk−1, i.e. those
alternatives y for which there is f ∈ Fk−1 such that y ∈WD(f), are collected in the set Yk.
Next the set Fk is defined as those collective strategies fX1,m,X2 in F0 where alternatives
outside Yk are never accepted, so both X
1 and X2 are subsets of Yk. From there one defines
the set Yk+1, and so on.
Lemma 9.3: For every k ∈ N it holds that Yk ⊂ Yk−1 and Fk ⊂ Fk−1.
Proof: The proof is by induction on k. It is clear that Y1 ⊂ Y0 and F1 ⊂ F0.
Assume for some k ∈ N we have shown that Yk ⊂ Yk−1 and Fk ⊂ Fk−1. We complete
the proof by showing that Yk+1 ⊂ Yk and Fk+1 ⊂ Fk.
If y ∈ Yk+1, then there is f ∈ Fk such that y ∈ WD(f). In view of the induction
hypothesis, we have f ∈ Fk−1 and hence y ∈ Yk. This proves that Yk+1 ⊂ Yk. If f ∈ Fk+1,
then car(f) ⊂ Yk+1. By the previous step, we have car(f) ⊂ Yk, so f ∈ Fk. This shows
that Fk+1 ⊂ Fk. 
We define the sets
Y∗ =
∞⋂
k=0
Yk and F∗ =
∞⋂
k=0
Fk.
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Since Y0, Y1, . . . is a decreasing sequence of finite sets, we have Yk = Yk+1 = Y∗ for k
sufficiently large, and therefore Fk = Fk+1 = F∗. It follows that
Y∗ =
⋃
f∈F∗
WD(f),
F∗ = {f ∈ F0 | car(f) ⊂ Y∗}.
The alternatives in Y∗ are said to be acceptable and the strategies in F∗ are said to be
viable. Corresponding to each acceptable alternative y ∈ Y∗ there is a game–plan in F∗
that could be used as a punishment game–plan following an unlawful rejection of y. As
follows from Theorems 9.7 and 9.9 below, the set Y∗ consists precisely of those alternatives
that are accepted in some collective equilibrium f ∈ T , and F∗ consists precisely of those
game–plans that can be played as the main or a punishment game–plan of such equilibria.
Our aim is to show the non–emptiness of the set Y∗.
The following lemma states an important continuity property of the payoff functions.
Essential is our assumption that the Markov process µ is irreducible as well as the condition
that the set X1 be non–empty.
Lemma 9.4: Consider X1, X2 ⊂ X with ∅ 6= X1 ⊂ X2. For every x ∈ X it holds that
Vx(fX1,m,X2) −→ Vx(fX1) as m→∞.
Proof: Fix some i ∈ N and consider the recursive equations
Vx,i(fX1,m+1,X2) =
∑
y∈X1
µ(y|x)ui(y) +
∑
y∈X\X1
µ(y|x)Vy,i(fX1,m,X2), (9.1)
Vx,i(fX1) =
∑
y∈X1
µ(y|x)ui(y) +
∑
y∈X\X1
µ(y|x)Vy,i(fX1). (9.2)
We define vx,m = Vx,i(fX1,m,X2)−Vx,i(fX1). It is sufficient to show that for every x ∈ X\X
1,
vx,m → 0 as m→∞. Subtracting equation (9.2) from (9.1) yields
vx,m+1 =
∑
y∈X\X1
µ(y|x)vy,m. (9.3)
We define the column vector vm = (vy,m)y∈X\X1 . Then (9.3) can be written as vm+1 = Avm,
where the entry of the non–negative matrix A corresponding to row x and column y is
µ(y|x). The sum of the entries in any given row of A is at most 1. Moreover, we can write
A in upper–triangular block form, with each block irreducible and the sum of the entries in
at least one row of the block strictly smaller than 1. It then follows that the spectral radius
of A is smaller than 1. This in turn implies that Am → 0 if m→ ∞, see Corollary 6.2.28
and Theorem 5.6.12 of Horn and Johnson (2007), and therefore that vm = A
mv0 → 0 if
31
m→∞. 
We are ready for the crucial step towards the proof of our main result: proving that
the sets Yk are all non–empty.
Theorem 9.5: The set Yk is non–empty and fYk ∈ Fk.
Proof: The proof is by induction on k.
It clearly holds that the set Y0 = X is non–empty and fY0 ∈ F0. Assume that for some
non-negative integer k we have shown that Yk 6= ∅ and fYk ∈ Fk.
We prove first that Yk+1 6= ∅. Suppose on the contrary that Yk+1 = ∅. Let x be an
element of Yk and let gm = f{x},m,Yk .
We claim that g0, g1, . . . are elements of Fk. By the induction hypothesis it holds
that g0 = fYk ∈ Fk. Assume that for some m we have shown that gm ∈ Fk. Then
SD(gm) ⊂ WD(gm) ⊂ Yk+1 = ∅. Applying Lemma 9.2 we conclude that gm+1 satisfies
Condition (6.2), so is an element of F0. Clearly gm+1 is carried by the set Yk, hence is an
element of Fk.
For every y ∈ X it holds that the sequence Vy(gm) approaches Vy(f{x}) as m → ∞.
Therefore, since X is finite, there is M sufficiently large such that SD(f{x}) ⊂ SD(gM).
The alternative x does not have the core property, for otherwise it would be an element of
Y∗ by Theorem 9.11 and hence an element of Yk+1 which is empty by supposition. Hence
the set SD(x) is non–empty. Since SD(x) = SD(f{x}), we have the inclusions
SD(f{x}) ⊂ SD(gM) ⊂WD(gM) ⊂ Yk+1,
where the rightmost inclusion holds because gM ∈ Fk. But this contradicts our supposition
that Yk+1 = ∅.
We have thus proven that Yk+1 is non–empty.
We show next that fYk+1 ∈ Fk+1. Let gm = fYk+1,m,Yk .
We claim that g0, g1, . . . are elements of Fk. Indeed, g0 = fYk ∈ Fk by the induction
hypothesis. Assume that for some m we have shown that gm ∈ Fk. Then it holds that
SD(gm) ⊂ WD(gm) ⊂ Yk+1. Applying Lemma 9.2.2, we conclude that gm+1 ∈ F0. Since
car(gm+1) = Yk, gm+1 is an element of Fk.
For every y ∈ X it holds that the sequence Vy(gm) converges to Vy(fYk+1) as m → ∞.
Therefore, since X is finite, there is M sufficiently large such that SD(fYk+1) ⊂ SD(gM).
Now we have the inclusions
SD(fYk+1) ⊂ SD(gM) ⊂WD(gM) ⊂ Yk+1
32
where the rightmost inclusion follows since gM ∈ Fk. By Lemma 9.2.1 it follows that
fYk+1 ∈ Fk+1, as desired.
This completes the induction step. 
Corollary 9.6 follows immediately from Theorem 9.5.
Corollary 9.6: The set Y∗ is non–empty and fY∗ ∈ F∗.
We now construct a collective equilibrium that satisfies the properties required in The-
orem 9.1. For each x ∈ Y∗, choose some fx ∈ F∗ with x ∈ WD(fx), and for x ∈ X \ Y∗
let fx be any element of F∗. As a special case we can take fx = fY∗ for x ∈ X \ Y∗. Let f0
be any element of F∗. As a special case we can take f0 to be equal to fY∗ . The set of all
collective strategies induced by a tuple (fj : j ∈ {0}∪X) as constructed in this paragraph
is denoted by G.
Theorem 9.7: Every collective strategy f∗ ∈ G is a collective equilibrium.
Proof: To prove that f∗ satisfies Condition (6.3) take an s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S with f∗(s) =
1. By Lemma 7.2 we have that P (f∗[s]) = P (fst) and therefore WD(f∗[s]) = WD(fst).
Since st is an element of WD(fst) by the choice of fst , we conclude that Condition (6.3) is
satisfied.
To prove that f∗ satisfies Condition (6.2) take an s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S with f∗(s) = 0.
Assume first that f∗(s0, . . . , sk) = 0 for every k = 0, . . . , t− 1. We have that f∗(s) = f0(s),
P (f∗[s]) = P (f0[s]), and consequently SD(f∗[s]) = SD(f0[s]). Since f0 satisfies Condition
(6.2), st is not an element of SD(f0[s]), hence also not of SD(f∗[s]), as desired.
Assume next that f∗(s0, . . . , sk) = 1 for some k = 0, . . . , t− 1. Let k
∗ be the largest k
with this property. We have that f∗(s) = fsk∗ (sk∗+1, . . . , st), P (f∗[s]) =
P (fsk∗ [sk∗+1, . . . , st]), and SD(f∗[s]) = SD(fsk∗ [sk∗+1, . . . , st]). Since fsk∗ satisfies Con-
dition (6.2), st is not an element of SD(fsk∗ [sk∗+1, . . . , st]), hence also not of SD(f∗[s]), as
desired. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 9.1.
In what follows we show that every collective equilibrium induced by two–step strategies
can be constructed as in the paragraph preceding Theorem 9.7. More precisely, consider
an element f ∈ T , a collective equilibrium induced by a collection of two–step game–plans
(fj : j ∈ {0}∪X). As Theorem 9.9 shows, the main game–plan of f as well as all relevant
punishment game–plans fx are elements of the set F∗. Here a punishment game–plan fx
is relevant if x belongs to the carrier of f . Indeed, if x does not belong to the carrier
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of f, then the alternative x is never accepted under the strategy f , and consequently the
punishment game–plan fx does not play any role.
We need a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 9.8: Let f be induced by the tuple (fj : j ∈ {0} ∪ X) of two-step strategies. For
every j ∈ {0} ∪ car(f), it holds that car(fj) ⊂ car(f).
Proof: Let fj = fX1,m,X2, so car(fj) = X
2. We have to show that X2 ⊂ car(f). If
j = 0, then let s be the empty sequence. If j ∈ car(f), then let s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S
be a sequence such that st = j and f(s) = 1. Take some y ∈ X
2. If y ∈ X1, then
f(s0, . . . , st, y) = fj(y) = 1. If y ∈ X
2 \X1, then consider the sequence (s0, . . . , st, y, . . . , y)
where y is repeated m + 1 times. We have f(s0, . . . , st, y, . . . , y) = fj(y, . . . , y) = 1. In
either case it holds that y ∈ car(f). 
Theorem 9.9: Let f be induced by the tuple (fj : j ∈ {0} ∪ X) of two-step strategies. If
f is a collective equilibrium, then car(f) ⊂ Y∗ and for every j ∈ {0} ∪ car(f) it holds that
fj ∈ F∗.
Proof: We show first that f0 ∈ F0. Let f0 = fX1,m,X2.
Suppose there is s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S such that st ∈ SD(f0[s]) and f0(s) = 0. Then
either t < m and st /∈ X
1 or t ≥ m and st /∈ X
2. Consider the sequence s′ = (s′0, . . . , s
′
t)
where for every k ∈ {0, . . . , t} it holds that s′k = st. For every k ∈ {0, . . . , t} it holds
that f0(s
′
0, . . . , s
′
k) = 0 and consequently also f(s
′
0, . . . , s
′
k) = 0. Therefore, SD(f0[s]) =
SD(f0[s
′]) = SD(f [s′]), where the first equality holds since f0[s] = f0[s
′] and the second
one is implied by Lemma 7.2, case 3. Since f satisfies condition (6.2) and f(s′) = 0 we
must have st /∈ SD(f [s
′]) and consequently st /∈ SD(f0[s]), yielding a contradiction.
It follows immediately from Definition 6.2 that for every x ∈ car(f) the collective
strategy induced by fx as the main game–plan and punishment game–plans (fy : y ∈ X) is
a collective equilibrium. The result of the preceding paragraph therefore applies to show
that fx ∈ F0 for every x ∈ car(f).
Assume we have shown that car(f) ⊂ Yk and for every j ∈ {0} ∪ car(f) it holds that
fj ∈ Fk. Consider some x ∈ car(f). Let s = (s0, . . . , st) ∈ S be such that st = x and
f(s) = 1. Since f is a collective equilibrium, it holds by Condition 6.3 that x ∈WD(f [s]).
Lemma 7.2, case 2, applies to show that WD(f [s]) = WD(fx). Since fx ∈ Fk by the
induction hypothesis, we have x ∈ Yk+1. We have shown that car(f) ⊂ Yk+1. The pre-
ceding lemma now implies that car(fj) ⊂ Yk+1 for every j ∈ {0} ∪ car(f). It follows that
fj ∈ Fk+1. The induction step is complete. 
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As a corollary of Theorem 9.9, we find that Y∗ contains all stationary collective equi-
libria.
Corollary 9.10: If the collective equilibrium fY is stationary, then Y ⊂ Y∗ and fY ∈ F∗.
By Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 6.4 it holds that if an alternative x has the core property,
then f{x} is a collective equilibrium. We thus obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 9.11: The core is a subset of Y∗.
Combining Theorems 9.7 and 9.9 provides a characterization of collective equilibria
induced by two–step game–plans. Stated succinctly, this characterization is as follows.
Corollary 9.12: It holds that G = T.
The collection of all two–step game–plans is a countable set. Our next step is to provide
an upper bound on the threshold of two–step game–plans that is sufficient to demonstrate
the existence of a collective equilibrium. This restriction of the threshold leads to a finite
set of two–step game–plans.
Lemma 9.13: There exists a natural number M such that for all subsets X1, X2 of X with
∅ 6= X1 ⊂ X2 it holds that SD(fX1) ⊂ SD(fX1,M,X2).
Proof: We explicitly define the number M which has the desired property. Let
u¯ = max{ui(x) | i ∈ N, x ∈ X}
be the maximum utility level reached by any alternative. By our assumption that there
is at least one alternative with a strictly positive payoff for some player, we have u¯ > 0.
Define
ǫ = min {ui(x)− Vx,i(fY ) | i ∈ N, x ∈ X, Y ⊂ X, and ui(x)− Vx,i(fY ) > 0} .
Notice that ǫ is well–defined and is positive since the sets N and X are finite.
For x ∈ X, let Mx be the least natural number such that for every alternative y ∈ X
there is probability greater than 1− ǫ/u¯ that y is selected at least once in the next M − 1
rounds if the current alternative is x. The irreducibility of µ implies that such anMx exists.
We define M = maxx∈X Mx.
Since fX1 and fX1,M,X2 coincide in periods 0, . . . ,M−1, and the probability that period
M is reached conditional on a rejection of x in period 0 is less than ǫ/u¯ under the collective
strategy fX1 , for every i ∈ N we have that
|Vx,i(fX1,M,X2)− Vx,i(fX1)| <
(
1− ǫ
u¯
)
0 + ǫ
u¯
u¯ = ǫ.
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Now take x ∈ SD(fX1) and let C = {i ∈ N | ui(x) > Vx,i(fX1)}. Then we have
ui(x)−Vx,i(fX1) ≥ ǫ for every i ∈ C by definition of ǫ. Since Vx,i(fX1) > Vx,i(fX1,M,X2)− ǫ,
we conclude that ui(x) > Vx,i(fX1,M,X2) for every i ∈ C, so x ∈ SD(fX1,M,X2), as desired. 
We define F¯0 as the subset of F0 consisting of two–step collective strategies with thresh-
old at most M. Starting from F¯0 we inductively define
Y¯k =
⋃
f∈Fk−1
WD(f),
F¯k = {f ∈ F¯0 | car(f) ⊂ Yk}.
We define the sets
Y¯∗ =
∞⋂
k=0
Y¯k and F¯∗ =
∞⋂
k=0
F¯k.
It can be shown as before that Y¯k = Y¯k+1 = Y¯∗ for k sufficiently large, F¯k = F¯k+1 = F¯∗,
and
Y¯∗ =
⋃
f∈F¯∗
WD(f),
F¯∗ = {f ∈ F¯0 | car(f) ⊂ Y¯∗},
where Y¯∗ 6= ∅. Indeed, the only adjustment in the proof occurs in the proof of Theorem 9.5,
where we can twice avoid the limit argument that is used in claiming the existence of a
suitable gM , and use directly the number M as coming from Lemma 9.13.
10 Three alternatives
In this section we consider the special case of the model with three alternatives, where
the alternatives give rise to a Condorcet cycle: SD(x2) = {x1}, SD(x3) = {x2}, and
SD(x1) = {x3}. We do not make any further assumption regarding the number of play-
ers, the collection of decisive coalitions, or the Markov process by which alternatives are
selected. Example 4.4 provides an illustration for the case of a quitting game with three
players and time and history independent probabilities to select alternatives, and Example
4.5 for the case when decision making takes place by means of majority voting.
The next result claims that the set Y∗ as constructed in the previous section consists
of all three alternatives. The equilibrium of Theorem 9.7 with f0 = fY∗ therefore has the
immediate acceptance property: whatever alternative is chosen by nature in period zero is
accepted.
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Theorem 10.1: Let X = {x1, x2, x3} and assume that SD(x2) = {x1}, SD(x3) = {x2},
and SD(x1) = {x3}. Then Y∗ = X.
Proof: It holds by definition that Y0 = X . We show that Y1 = X as well, from which it
follows that Yk = X for every k = 0, 1, . . . .
We prove first that x1 ∈ Y1. Since Y0 = X, it clearly holds that fX ∈ F0.
Assume x1 ∈WD(fX). We then obviously have x1 ∈ Y1.
Assume x1 /∈ WD(fX). Choose M as in Lemma 9.13. For m = 0, . . . ,M, we define
the collective strategy gm = f{x2},m,{x2,x3}. It holds that x1 ∈ SD(x2) = SD(f{x2}). By the
choice of the threshold M we know that SD(f{x2}) ⊂ SD(gM) and hence x1 ∈ SD(gM) ⊂
WD(gM). Now let k be the smallest number in {0, . . . ,M} such that x1 ∈WD(gk).
We claim that g0, . . . , gk belong to F0. To prove this we only need to show that g0, . . . , gk
all satisfy Condition (6.2).
To show that g0 = f{x2,x3} satisfies Condition (6.2), we have to prove that x1 /∈
SD(f{x2,x3}). We have that
Vx1(f{x2,x3}) =
µ(x2 | x1)
1− µ(x1 | x1)
u(x2) +
µ(x3 | x1)
1− µ(x1 | x1)
u(x3),
Vx1(fX) = µ(x1 | x1)u(x1) + µ(x2 | x1)u(x2) + µ(x3 | x1)u(x3).
Rearranging terms we find that ui(x1) ≥ Vx1,i(f{x2,x3}) if and only if ui(x1) ≥ Vx1,i(fX).
Since x1 /∈WD(fX), we have x1 /∈WD(f{x2,x3}) ⊃ SD(f{x2,x3}), as desired.
Assume gm satisfies Condition (6.2) for some integer m ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}. We know that
x1 /∈ SD(gm) by the choice of k and since m < k. We claim that also x3 /∈ SD(gm). Indeed,
Vx3(gm) is a convex combination of u(x2) and u(x3). Hence if ui(x3) > Vx3,i(gm) then it
holds necessarily that ui(x3) > ui(x2). Since x3 /∈ SD(x2) we conclude that x3 /∈ SD(gm).
We have shown that SD(gm) ⊂ {x2}. By Lemma 9.2.2 it follows that gm+1 satisfies
Condition (6.2).
We have thus shown that gk ∈ F0. Since k is chosen such that x1 ∈WD(gk), it follows
that x1 ∈ Y1.
It follows by symmetry that x2 and x3 belong to Y1. 
When we apply the construction in the proof of Theorem 10.1 to Example 4.4, we find
the collective strategy as defined in Example 7.1. The main game–plan is determined by
the stationary collective strategy f0 = fX so all alternatives are accepted in period 0. Since
WD(fX) = {x2, x3}, the punishment game–plans following unlawful rejections of x2 and
x3 are given by fx2 = fx3 = fX . If we define gm = f{x2},m,{x2,x3}, then the smallest value for
m for which x1 ∈WD(gm) is equal to 1. This leads to the choice fx1 = g1 in Example 7.1.
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Figure 1: The set X∗.
11 Redistributive politics
In this section we consider a situation of redistributive politics, where three players have
to allocate K identical units of an indivisible good, using the simple majority voting rule.
This application corresponds to the discrete version of the famous model of Baron and
Ferejohn (1989). The set of alternatives is
X = {x ∈ N30 | x1 + x2 + x3 = K},
where N0 is the set of natural numbers including zero, and the utility functions are given
by ui(x) = xi. For every x ∈ X, the set C(x) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} consists of
all sets containing at least two players. We assume that each alternative is selected with
equal probability, thus µ0(y) = µ(y|x) = 1/|X| for all x, y ∈ X. The core of this game is
empty whenever K ≥ 4.
Let X∗ denote the set of allocations where at least two players receive at least K/3
units of the good, that is
X∗ = {x ∈ X | |{i ∈ N : xi ≥ K/3}| ≥ 2}.
The set X∗ is depicted in Figure 1. It is non–empty if K ≥ 2. The set X∗ is symmetric,
which implies V (fX∗) = (K/3, K/3, K/3). It follows that X∗ = WD(fX∗), so we have the
following result.
Theorem 11.1: Assume K ≥ 2. It holds that fX∗ is a stationary collective equilibrium.
All players expect a payoff of K/3 and accept any alternative which promises at least
K/3. It follows that the first alternative drawn which provides at least two players with a
payoff greater than or equal to K/3 will be accepted.
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The question we are interested in is how the set Y∗ of alternatives constructed in
Section 9 relates to X∗. By Corollary 9.10 we have that X∗ ⊂ Y∗. We can easily prove that
the set Y∗ does not include allocations where one player gets everything.
Lemma 11.2: Assume K ≥ 3. The alternatives (K, 0, 0), (0, K, 0), and (0, 0, K) do not
belong to Y∗.
Proof: To obtain a contradiction suppose that (K, 0, 0) is an element of Y∗. Then there
is a collective strategy f = fX1,m,X2 ∈ F∗ such that V2(f) = 0 or V3(f) = 0. Without loss
of generality, assume V3(f) = 0. It follows that x3 = 0 for each x ∈ X
2. In particular,
the allocation (K − 1, 0, 1) is not in X2, and since f satisfies Condition (6.2), (K − 1, 0, 1)
does not strictly dominate fX2 . Since V3(fX2) = 0 this implies that V1(fX2) ≥ K − 1.
Similarly, (0, K − 1, 1) is not in X2, so V2(fX2) ≥ K − 1. Adding these inequalities yields
V1(fX2) + V2(fX2) ≥ 2(K − 1) > K, a contradiction. 
Let α(K) denote the worst payoff for player i from a collective strategy in the set T for
the K-unit allocation problem,
α(K) = inf{Vi(f) | f ∈ T}.
This expression does not depend on i by symmetry of the game. We argue next that the
infimum is a minimum.
Lemma 11.3: For every i ∈ N, there is a collective strategy f ∈ T such that Vi(f) = α(K).
Proof: Suppose, there is no collective strategy f ∈ T such that Vi(f) = α(K). Then
there are non–empty subsets X1, X2 of X such that X1 ⊂ X2 and a sequence of natural
numbers {mn}n∈N such that fX1,mn,X2 ∈ F∗ and Vi(fX1,mn,X2) → α(K) as n → ∞. Since
by Lemma 9.4 the sequence Vi(fX1,mn,X2) converges to Vi(fX1), we have Vi(fX1) = α(K).
However, since fX1,mn,X2 is an element of F∗, so is fX1 , yielding a contradiction. 
The stationary collective equilibrium of Theorem 11.1 gives all players a payoff of K/3,
so α(K) ≤ K/3. Theorem 11.4 shows that any collective equilibrium induced by two–step
game–plans, i.e. any collective equilibrium in T, leads to approximately the same payoffs
when K is sufficiently large.
Theorem 11.4: It holds that
lim
K→∞
α(K)
K
=
1
3
.
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Proof: Fix some K and define α = α(K). If y ∈ Y∗ then there is f ∈ F∗ such that
y ∈WD(f). Hence there are at least two players i such that yi ≥ Vi(f) ≥ α. We therefore
have the inclusion
Y∗ ⊂ {x ∈ X | |{i ∈ N : xi ≥ α}| ≥ 2}. (11.1)
We will put a lower bound on the equilibrium payoff of, without loss of generality,
Player 3. To do so, for given continuation utilities z ∈ R3+, we compute the expected
payoffs φ(z) to Player 3 resulting from a collective strategy that rejects an alternative x
if and only if (x1, x3) ≪ (α, α) or (x2, x3) ≪ (α, α), or (x1, x2) ≤ (z1, z2), pretending that
the continuation utilities are indeed equal to z. More precisely, we have
φ(z) =
1
|X|
∑
x∈X
φx(z),
where
φx(z) =

z3, if [x1 < α and x3 < α] or [x2 < α and x3 < α] or [x1 ≤ z1 and x2 ≤ z2],x3, otherwise.
We consider continuation utilities in the set Z defined by
Z = {z ∈ R3+ | z1 + z2 + z3 = K, z1 ≥ α, z2 ≥ α, z3 = α}.
The next lemma shows that the evaluation of φ on Z provides a lower bound for α.
Lemma 11.5: There exists z¯ ∈ Z such that φ(z¯) ≤ α.
Proof: Let fX1,m,X2 ∈ F∗ be such that α = V3(fX1,m,X2) and let z = V (fX1,m−1,X2). If
m = 0 we set X1 = X2 and have fX1,m−1,X2 denote the collective strategy fX2 . We observe
that z1 + z2 + z3 = K, and z ≥ (α, α, α) since fX1,m−1,X2 belongs to F∗.
Consider some x ∈ X1. We have xi ≥ α for at least two players i, since X
1 ⊂ Y∗. If
φx(z) 6= x3, then φx(z) = z3, x1 ≤ z1 and x2 ≤ z2, which implies z3 ≤ x3. Otherwise, it
holds that φx(z) = x3. In both cases we have φx(z) ≤ x3.
Consider some x ∈ X\X1. Since fX1,m,X2 is an element of F∗ it holds that SD(fX1,m−1,X2) ⊂
X1, so there is at most one player i such that xi > zi. If φx(z) 6= z3, then φx(z) = x3, and
x1 > z1 or x2 > z2. It follows that x3 ≤ z3. Otherwise, it holds that φx(z) = z3. In both
cases we have φx(z) ≤ z3.
It holds that
φ(z) =
1
|X|
∑
x∈X
φx(z) ≤
1
|X|
(
∑
x∈X1
x3 +
∑
x∈X\X1
z3) = V3(fX1,m,X2) = α.
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We define z¯ = (z1+ z3−α, z2, α). We show that, for each x ∈ X, φx(z¯) ≤ φx(z), which
implies φ(z¯) ≤ φ(z) and proves the lemma. If [x1 < α and x3 < α] or [x2 < α and x3 < α]
or [x1 ≤ z1 and x2 ≤ z2], then φx(z) = z3 and φx(z¯) = z¯3, and the result follows since
z¯3 = α ≤ z3. Otherwise, we have φx(z) = x3. If φx(z¯) = z¯3 we must have x1 ≤ z¯1 and
x2 ≤ z¯2, so z¯3 ≤ x3 as desired. 
We continue by deriving a lower bound on φ(z¯) for z¯ ∈ Z, which in turn serves as the
lower bound on α presented in the next lemma.
Lemma 11.6: It holds that
α ≥
1
3
K +
8α3 − (K − α + 2)3
4(K + 1)(K + 2)
.
Proof: Take some z¯ ∈ Z satisfying the conditions of Lemma 11.5. We show that the
right-hand side of the inequality in Lemma 11.6 is a lower bound for φ(z¯).
For r ∈ R, let ⌊r⌋ be the greatest integer less than or equal to r, and ⌈r⌉ be the smallest
integer greater than or equal to r. We define the subsets C1, C2, and C3 of X by
C1 = {x ∈ X | x1 < α, x3 < α} = {x ∈ X | x1 ≤ ⌈α⌉ − 1, x3 ≤ ⌈α⌉ − 1},
C2 = {x ∈ X | x2 < α, x3 < α} = {x ∈ X | x2 ≤ ⌈α⌉ − 1, x3 ≤ ⌈α⌉ − 1},
C3 = {x ∈ X | x1 ≤ z¯1, x2 ≤ z¯2} = {x ∈ X | x1 ≤ ⌊z¯1⌋, x2 ≤ ⌊z¯2⌋},
and define C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3. Since
V3(fX) =
|X \ C|
|X|
V3(fX\C) +
|C|
|X|
V3(fC) =
1
3
K,
V (fC) =
∑
i=1,2,3
|C i|
|C|
V (fCi),
it holds that
φ(z¯) =
|C|
|X|
z¯3 +
|X \ C|
|X|
V3(fX\C) =
|C|
|X|
z¯3 +
1
3
K −
|C|
|X|
V3(fC)
=
1
3
K +
∑
i=1,2,3
|C i|
|X|
(z¯3 − V3(fCi)). (11.2)
A simple calculation reveals that
|C1| = ⌈α⌉2, V3(fC1) =
1
2
(⌈α⌉ − 1),
|C2| = ⌈α⌉2, V3(fC2) =
1
2
(⌈α⌉ − 1),
|C3| = (⌊z¯1⌋+ 1)(⌊z¯2⌋ + 1), V3(fC3) = K −
1
2
⌊z¯1⌋ −
1
2
⌊z¯2⌋,
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so
z¯3 − V3(fC1) = α−
1
2
(⌈α⌉ − 1) ≥ 1
2
α,
z¯3 − V3(fC2) = α−
1
2
(⌈α⌉ − 1) ≥ 1
2
α,
z¯3 − V3(fC3) = z¯3 −K +
1
2
⌊z¯1⌋+
1
2
⌊z¯2⌋ ≥ α−K +
1
2
z¯1 +
1
2
z¯2 − 1 = −
1
2
(K − α + 2).
It is immediate that
|C1|(z¯3 − V3(fC1)) ≥ ⌈α⌉
2 1
2
α ≥ 1
2
α3, (11.3)
|C2|(z¯3 − V3(fC2)) ≥ ⌈α⌉
2 1
2
α ≥ 1
2
α3. (11.4)
Using the fact that ab ≤ (a+ b)2/4, we derive
|C3| ≤ 1
4
(⌊z¯1⌋+ 1 + ⌊z¯2⌋+ 1)
2 ≤ 1
4
(z¯1 + z¯2 + 2)
2 = 1
4
(K − α + 2)2.
Therefore it holds that
|C3|(z¯3 − V3(fC3)) ≥ −
1
8
(K − α + 2)3. (11.5)
Finally, we observe that
|X| =
K∑
k=0
(K + 1− k) =
1
2
(K + 1)(K + 2). (11.6)
After substituting (11.3)–(11.6) into (11.2), we find the desired lower bound. 
To complete the proof of the theorem, assume without loss of generality that the se-
quence α(K)/K converges to some non-negative limit β. From Lemma 11.6 we obtain
β = lim
K→∞
α(K)
K
≥
1
3
+ lim
K→∞
8α3 − (K − α + 2)3
4K(K + 1)(K + 2)
=
1
3
+ 2β3 −
1
4
(1− β)3.
After some rewriting, we find this expression to be equivalent to
(1− 3β)2(1 + 3β) ≤ 0.
The only non-negative value for β satisfying the latter inequality is β = 1/3. 
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12 Robustness of collective equilibria
Examples 4.4 and 4.5 show that collective stopping games may not have stationary equi-
libria. In the presence of breakdown, stationary equilibria are guaranteed to exist, but
may be in mixed strategies as demonstrated by Example 4.6. It can be hard to compute
the exact probabilities in a mixed strategy that are needed to make the players indifferent
between accepting and rejecting a particular alternative, and, moreover, these probabilities
change when the utilities of the alternatives or the transition probabilities in the selection
dynamics change. We argue next that collective equilibria generated by two–step game–
plans on the other hand are robust to small changes in utilities and in Markov transition
probabilities that govern the selection of alternatives.
To do so, we fix the set of players, alternatives, and the decision rules used, and param-
eterize a game Γ(µ, u) by the Markov process µ that governs the choice of alternatives and
the profile of utility functions u. Since the probability distribution µ0 from which alter-
natives are initially drawn only influences equilibrium utilities, but not the accept/reject
decisions themselves, we do not use it in our parametrization. We identify µ with its
stochastic matrix of transition probabilities. The set of stochastic matrices is denoted by
M. The profile of utility functions u is identified with a point in U = RN×X+ .
A key property of strategies induced by two–step game–plans is the following.
Lemma 12.1: If f is induced by two–step game–plans, then {f [s] | s ∈ S} is a finite set.
Proof: If f is a two–step collective strategy, then the cardinality of {f [s] | s ∈ S} is at
most m+ 1, where m is the threshold of f .
Next consider the case where f is induced by a tuple F = (f0, fx : x ∈ X) of two–step
strategies. For each s ∈ S, the collective strategy f [s] is induced by the tuple (g, fx : x ∈ X)
where g equals h[r] for some member h of F and r ∈ {∅} ∪ S. By the observation in the
previous paragraph there are at most finitely many of such strategies g, and the result
follows. 
We let V µ,ux,i (f) denote the payoff to player i in the game Γx(µ, u) under the collective
strategy f .
Lemma 12.2: Let f be a collective strategy induced by two–step game–plans. Then the
function V µ,ux,i (f) is continuous at each point of M×U .
Proof: We first prove the lemma for stationary strategies. Let f = fX1 where X
1 is a
non–empty subset of X . In view of Equation (9.2) it is sufficient to prove that V µ,ux,i (fX1)
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is a continuous function of (µ, u) for each x ∈ X \X1. Letting
vy = V
µ,u
y,i (fX1), ay =
∑
z∈X1
µ(z|y)ui(z), and Axy = µ(y|x)
for all x and y in X \X1 we can rewrite (9.2) in the vector–matrix notation as v = a+Av.
As we have argued in the proof of Lemma 9.4, the spectral radius of A is smaller than one.
This means that the matrix (I − A) is invertible. Hence v = (I − A)−1a, an expression
that is continuous in A and a. Clearly A and a are continuous as functions of (µ, u) on
M×U .
Equation (9.1) implies that if Vx,i(fX1,m,X2) is continuous in (µ, u) for each x ∈ X , so
is Vx,i(fX1,m+1,X2) for each x ∈ X . This establishes the lemma for any two–step collective
strategy.
Finally consider a collective strategy f induced by two–step game–plans. Let f0 be the
collective strategy defining the main game–plan of f, so V µ,ux,i (f) = V
µ,u
x,i (f0). Since f0 is
two–step, the result follows from the conclusion of the preceding paragraph. 
Consider a collective equilibrium f ∈ T of the game Γ(µ¯, u¯). It is said to be robust if it
is a collective equilibrium of the game Γ(µ, u) for each (µ, u) in some open neighborhood
of (µ¯, u¯). A subset of U is said to be negligible if it is meager and has Lebesgue measure
zero.
Theorem 12.3: There is a set G ⊂M× U such that
[1] For each (µ, u) ∈ G, every collective equilibrium f ∈ T is robust.
[2] For each µ ∈ M, the complement of the µ–section of the set G in U is negligible as
a subset of U .
Proof: It will be convenient to write the payoff on f as
V µ,ux,i (f) =
∑
y∈X
νµ(f, x; y)ui(y), (12.1)
where νµ(f, x; y) is the probability that the play of the game Γx(µ, u) terminates with the
acceptance of the alternative y. Let
T µ =
⋃
x∈X
{f ∈ T | νµ(f, x; x) = 1}.
If f ∈ T µ then there is an x ∈ X such that V µ,ux,i (f) = ui(x) for all u ∈ U and all i ∈ N .
For each f ∈ T define the subset Uµf of U as follows: If f is an element of T
µ we set
Uµf = {u ∈ U : ui(x) 6= ui(y) for all (i, x, y) ∈ N ×X ×X with x 6= y}.
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If f is not an element of T µ we set
Uµf = {u ∈ U : ui(x) 6= V
µ,u
x,i (f) for all (i, x) ∈ N ×X}.
We define
Uµ =
⋂
f∈T
Uµf and G =
⋃
µ∈M
{µ} × Uµ.
We complete the proof by showing that the set G thus defined has properties [1] and [2]
required by the theorem.
Clearly Uµ is a µ–section of G. We show that the complement of Uµ is negligible. Since
the set T is countable, it suffices to show that for each f ∈ T the complement of Uµf is
negligible.
First consider the case f ∈ T µ. In this case the complement of Uµf is covered by finitely
many sets of the form {u ∈ U | ui(x) = ui(y)} where i ∈ N and x 6= y. Each such set is a
lower–dimensional subspace of U and hence a negligible set.
Suppose f is not in T µ. The complement of Uµf is then covered by finitely many sets of
the form C = {u ∈ U | ui(x) = V
µ,u
x,i (f)}. Since the payoff V
µ,u
x,i (f) is linear in u, the set C
is a linear subspace of U . It is a proper subset of U because νµ(f, x; x) < 1. We conclude
that C is a lower–dimensional subspace of U and is hence negligible.
Take a game (µ¯, u¯) ∈ G. For each f ∈ T, we define an open neighborhood of (µ¯, u¯) by
letting
O(f) =
⋂
i∈N
⋂
x∈X
{
(µ, u) ∈M×U |
u¯i(x) > V
µ¯,u¯
x,i (f) implies ui(x) > V
µ,u
x,i (f)
u¯i(x) < V
µ¯,u¯
x,i (f) implies ui(x) < V
µ,u
x,i (f)
}
.
Invoking the definition of U µ¯ it is easy to see that for every game (µ, u) ∈ O(f) the
alternative x ∈ X strictly (weakly) dominates f in the game Γ(µ, u) if and only if it does
so in the game Γ(µ¯, u¯).
Let f¯ ∈ T be a collective equilibrium of Γ(µ¯, u¯). We argue that f¯ is robust. We define
O =
⋂
s∈S
O(f¯ [s]),
the intersection being finite by Lemma 12.1. Take any (µ, u) ∈ O. By the remark in the
previous paragraph, for every s ∈ S, the alternative x strictly (weakly) dominates f¯ [s] in
the game Γ(µ, u) if and only if it does so in the game Γ(µ¯, u¯). It follows directly from
Definition 6.2 that f¯ is a collective equilibrium of Γ(µ, u), as desired. 
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13 Incomplete information
In this section, we generalize our model by allowing the voting order to be probabilistic
and history–dependent, and information to be incomplete. We continue to assume that
players observe the moves by nature, but we do no longer require that a player observes
the actions of other players.
We therefore consider a game Γ′ defined as follows. In each period t = 0, 1, . . . nature
draws an alternative x from a set X according to the Markov process µ on X, where the
selection in period 0 occurs according to the probability distribution µ0 on X. Then nature
selects the first player to vote on x, say player i1 ∈ N . After Player i1 casts a “y” or
an “n” vote, nature chooses the next player to cast a vote, say player i2 ∈ N \ {i1}, who
casts a “y” or an “n” vote. Next nature chooses player i3 ∈ N \ {i1, i2}, and so on until
all players have voted. The choice of a responder ik may be probabilistic and may depend
on the entire history of play. If the set of players who voted “y” is decisive, the game
ends and player i ∈ N receives utility ui(x). Otherwise the next period begins. Perpetual
disagreement results in utility zero for all players.
Let Hi denote the set of finite histories after which it is player i’s turn to cast a vote.
The description of the game Γ′ is completed by specifying the information sets for every
player: Hi denotes the information partition of Hi for player i. Given a history h ∈ Hi, th
denotes the current period at h, and corresponds to the number of alternatives that have
been voted down so far. For t = 0, . . . , th, the alternative chosen by nature in period t is
denoted by xt(h) and for t = 0, . . . , th − 1, we write a
i
t(h) for the action taken by player i
in period t. With respect to the information structure of the game we make the following
assumption.
[A5] If h, h′ belong to the same information set Ii in Hi, then
1. th = th′,
2. for every t = 0, . . . , th, xt(h) = xt(h
′),
3. for every t = 0, . . . , th − 1, a
i
t(h) = a
i
t(h
′).
Since we allow for incomplete information, besides the case with sequential voting, we
now also cover cases where some or all of the players cast their votes simultaneously. For
example, we allow for the case where all players vote simultaneously and the votes are
never revealed, as well as the case where all players vote simultaneously and all votes cast
in a given period are revealed at the the end of that period.
46
A strategy of player i is a map σi : Hi → [0, 1]. A sequential equilibrium of Γ
′ specifies
a joint strategy as well as the beliefs that each player has regarding the relative likelihood
of different histories in the same information set. A belief system of player i specifies a
probability distributions βi(Ii) on the set Ii for each Ii ∈ Hi. A sequential equilibrium is
defined as a pair (σ, β) such that σ is a joint strategy and β a belief system such that σ is
sequentially rational given β, and β is consistent with σ.
A joint strategy σ is said to be sequentially rational given the belief system β if for
every player i ∈ N and each of player i’s information sets Ii ∈ Hi, the strategy σi is a
best response against the joint strategy σ conditional on reaching information set Ii given
the belief system βi(Ii). The condition of consistency encompasses the requirement that
β be derived from σ using Bayes’ rule and it also imposes some restrictions on how βi(Ii)
should be defined for those information sets Ii that are reached with probability zero. We
deliberately avoid stating a more precise definition of consistency since the result below is
valid for any definition of consistency satisfying the extremely mild requirement that for
every joint strategy σ there is at least one system of beliefs consistent with σ. Hence we
simply assume that some definition of consistency satisfying this requirement is used and
we write L(σ) to denote the set of beliefs consistent with the joint strategy σ.
Notice that each action–independent strategy σi of the game Γ naturally induces a
strategy σ′i in the game Γ
′. For Ii ∈ Hi, choose h ∈ Ii, define s ∈ S by st = xt(h) for
t = 0, . . . , th, and let σ
′
i(Ii) be equal to σi(s). We can now state the following result:
Theorem 13.1: Let σ be a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ in pure action–
independent strategies. Then (σ′, β) is a sequential equilibrium of Γ′ whenever β ∈ L(σ′).
The intuition for the result is straightforward: If all players use an action–independent
strategy, then any additional information contained in the information partition Hi is
irrelevant: a strategy is a sequentially rational (or not) irrespective of the beliefs. We spell
out the proof at the risk of proving the obvious. Consider an information set Ii ∈ Hi,
h ∈ Ii, and define s ∈ S by st = xt(h) for t = 0, . . . , th. Since σ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of Γ, the strategy σi is a best response for player i in each subgame of Γ that
follows the rejection of the alternatives s0, . . . , st. It follows that σi is a best response in Γ
′
conditional on reaching Ii when player i puts probability 1 on any given information node
h ∈ Ii. It then follows that σi is a best response under any probability distribution that
player i might have on Ii.
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14 Conclusion
Collective stopping games form a rich class of games that include collective choice games,
quitting games, and coalition formation games as special cases. Particular examples of
collective stopping games involve recruitment decisions by committees, business financing
decisions, and oligopoly exit decisions. The standard equilibrium concept to analyze such
games, stationary equilibrium in subgame perfect strategies, is problematic as for collective
stopping games it may not exist at all or only exist in mixed strategies. Moreover, the
existing literature has only demonstrated the existence of subgame perfect ǫ–equilibria.
This triggers the question whether even subgame perfect equilibria may not always exist
for such games.
In this paper we show not only that subgame perfect equilibria always exist in col-
lective stopping games, but also that we can define a finite set of strategies which is
guaranteed to contain a subgame perfect equilibrium. We require strategies to be pure and
action–independent, where the latter property has the advantage that we can incorporate
various degrees of incomplete information as far as the voting behavior of the players is
concerned. Action–independence also allows us to summarize the play of the game by
collective strategies. We require collective strategies to be simple and to be generated by
two–step game–plans. Under a two–step game–plan, the game ends when as soon as nature
draws an alternative from some set X1 in the first m periods, or when nature draws an
alternative from a bigger set X2 in a later period. Since we can formulate an upper bound
on m, this leads to the desired finite set of strategies which is shown to contain a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
A particular example is the case of three alternatives, where utilities of the players and
decision rules for the acceptance of an alternative are such that a Condorcet cycle results.
Such examples can easily occur in the context of collective choice or in coalition formation
processes. In such an example stationary equilibria may not exist at all. Subgame perfect
equilibria in pure and action–independent strategies do exist, where the induced collective
strategy is such that any alternative is accepted in period 0 and the unlawful rejection of
an alternative is followed by a particular two–step punishment game–plan. In the Baron-
Ferejohn model of redistributive politics, stationary equilibria do exist. We show that when
the units that can be used for redistributive purposes are sufficiently small, the payoffs of
collective equilibria induced by two–step game–plans are arbitrarily close to the payoffs
from a stationary equilibrium.
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